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INTRODUCTION 
Given the policy in favor of enforcing contracts in general2 and the specific 
policy in favor of and enforcing agreements that are a part of a settlement,3 one 
might expect a court to look very skeptically when a party to a personal injury 
                                                        
2  Courts rarely set aside contracts of any kind. See Davis v. G N Mortgage Corp., 244 F. 
Supp. 2d 950, 956 (2003) (“A bedrock principle of contract law is pacta sunt servanda, 
which translates from Latin as ‘agreements must be kept.’ ”). This reticence to set aside a 
contract is a result, at least in part, of the notion that enforcement of contracts honors the pol-
icy of freedom of contract that underpins our society’s system of economic ordering by pro-
tecting justified expectations, providing stability to transactions, and honoring the autonomy 
of the individual to enter into the transaction of that individual’s choice. Professor John Ed-
ward Murray explained as follows: “If people cannot project their realistic needs, desires and 
aspirations into the future and be assured that they will be fulfilled, their creative energies 
will not be released. The social institution of contract is an indispensable condition, not only 
to economic freedom, but freedom, itself.” JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON 
CONTRACTS § 1, at 3 (5th ed. 2011); see also discussion infra Section VI.A. 
3  In addition to the general desire to enforce contracts, courts also state that they favor and 
encourage the settlement of disputes outside of courts. Courts acknowledge the need to re-
spect settlement agreements because the finality of those agreements is a vital part of the 
policy of encourage settlements. See Schmidt v. Smith, 216 N.W.2d 669, 672 (Minn. 1974) 
(“To permit them [release settlements] to be vacated except for the most compelling reason 
creates ‘uncertainty, chaos, and confusion’ with respect to future dispositions, and is a dis-
service to other litigants whose matters are thereby delayed”) (quoting Simons v. Schiek’s, 
Inc., 145 N.W.2d 548, 553 (Minn. 1966) (Otis, J., dissenting)); see also discussion infra Sec-
tion VI.B. 
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release asks a court to set aside the release. But many courts have reacted atyp-
ically when injured parties who have settled their claims have sought to have 
those releases set aside on the basis of a lack of understanding or knowledge 
about the injury.4 Absent facts supporting a claim of fraud or duress, injured 
parties have turned to the mistake doctrine for relief. 
Injured parties make, implicitly or explicitly, two separate claims when 
urging that they should not be held to the releases they signed. First, the injured 
parties—the releasors—claim that they entered into the releases suffering from 
mistakes about injuries suffered.5 For example, an injured party might agree to 
release the tortfeasor for injuries suffered when she knows that she has suffered 
a concussion. Later, she might seek to avoid the release after she discovers that 
a result of the incident is a seizure disorder and she was therefore mistaken as 
to the injury.6 Second, because in the typical situation, such a party signs a 
document that states that the injured party releases the other party regarding all 
injuries, even those unknown,7 the injured party must also convince the court 
that the written release should not be interpreted to apply to unknown injuries 
or that the words of the written release should be, simply, disregarded.8 
In this setting many courts have devised unique techniques to tilt the play-
ing field in favor of the injured party. These techniques involve idiosyncratic 
application of the mistake doctrine, novel attitudes toward written contract lan-
guage, and even the creation of an added analysis of whether the release was 
fairly and knowingly made. In using these techniques, some courts, implicitly 
or explicitly, have engaged in a hindsight substantive review of the fairness of 
the deal. These courts are very lenient in the analysis of what constitutes a mis-
take, are very lenient regarding the requirement of mutuality of the mistake, do 
                                                        
4  This article addresses releases that are in settlement of a claim regarding injuries already 
incurred by the releasing party. It does not address exculpatory agreements, sometimes also 
called releases, entered into before any injury occurs. Parties often challenge such exculpato-
ry agreements as unenforceable because they are contrary to public policy. See, e.g., Combs 
v. W. Siloam Speedway Corp., 406 P.3d 1064, 1066–67 (Okla. Civ. App. 2017) (considering 
exculpatory release signed before car race attendance); Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp., 47 
A.3d 1190, 1198–99, 1203 (Pa. 2012) (considering exculpatory release signed before snow 
tubing). 
5  See, e.g., Delpino v. Spinks, No. N13C-03-288, 2014 WL 4348236, at *1–3 (Del. Super. 
Ct. Aug. 22, 2014) (involving a plaintiff who signed a release while believing injury to be a 
shoulder strain but claimed mistake when he later learned injury was a labral tear requiring 
surgery); Ranta v. Rake, 421 P.2d 747, 749–51 (Idaho 1967) (explaining plaintiff signed re-
lease believing injury to be minor but claimed mistake when he later learned the injury was a 
herniated disc requiring surgery). 
6  This is, in effect, what occurred in Gleason v. Guzman, 623 P.2d 378, 380 (Colo. 1981). 
7  For example, in Maglin v. Tschannerl, 800 A.2d 486, 487 (Vt. 2002), the Vermont Su-
preme Court reviewed a release which related to “all injuries, known and unknown, both to 
the person and the property, which have resulted or may in the future develop from an acci-
dent . . . .” (emphasis in original); see also infra Part I (for other examples of release lan-
guage). 
8  See, e.g., Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452, 1458–60 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying 
Guam law) (discussing these arguments). 
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not apply the conscious ignorance concept, and do not apply the traditional re-
spect given to written agreements—thereby neglecting to acknowledge assump-
tions of the risk taken by the personal injury releasor in the written agreement. 
For the situation to fit into the traditional mutual mistake framework, there 
must be a belief that is not in accord with the facts at the time the parties enter 
into the release.9 If a court takes a broad view of the situation, it might deter-
mine that as long as the injured party knew he or she was injured at the time of 
the release, then there was no mistake. Rather than take such an unforgiving 
path, some courts attempt the arguably impossible task of distinguishing a later-
claimed injury as an injury unknown at the time of contracting rather than a 
consequence of an injury known at the time of the signing of the release.10 The 
courts then recognize the unknown injuries as legally cognizable mistakes.11 
The distinctions made by some courts applying this analysis are fine, indeed.12 
Other courts adopt a broader view of what might constitute a mistake. These 
courts accept as sufficient a mistake about the nature or extent of the injury.13 
Thus, the injury need not be unknown at the time of the release for it to be a 
cognizable mistake for purposes of the mistake doctrine.14 
Some courts assume the releasee shares the mistake.15 While mutual mis-
take doctrine requires that both parties to the release be mistaken,16 courts often 
do not address the question of whether the other party to the release, the re-
                                                        
9  Section 151 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states: “A mistake is a belief that is 
not in accord with the facts.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 (AM. LAW INST. 
1981); see also Koam Produce, Inc. v. DiMare Homestead, Inc., 329 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 
2003) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151). See discussion infra Section 
IV.A. 
10  See, e.g., LaFleur v. C.C. Pierce Co., 496 N.E.2d 827, 830–31 (Mass. 1986) (explaining 
ignorance of injury required; ignorance of consequences insufficient); see discussion infra 
Section V.A. 
11  See, e.g., Mangini v. McClurg, 249 N.E.2d 386, 391–92 (N.Y. 1969) (explaining that in-
jured party was aware of hip pain yet court found evidence sufficient to survive summary 
judgment motion on the issue of whether hip injury was an unknown injury); see discussion 
infra Section V.A. 
12  See discussion infra Section V.A. 
13  See, e.g., Simmons v. Blauw, 635 N.E.2d 601, 604 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (explaining that 
mistakes about the nature and extent of injuries are legally cognizable); see also discussion 
infra Section V.B. 
14  See, e.g., Simmons, 635 N.E.2d at 604 (explaining that mistake as to nature or extent is 
accepted for purposes of the doctrine); see also discussion infra Section V.B. 
15  See, e.g., Gleason v. Guzman, 623 P.2d 378, 385–86 (Colo. 1981) (describing how the 
injured party survived a motion for summary judgment without a discussion of whether the 
other party was mistaken); see also Bernstein v. Kapneck, 430 A.2d 602, 607 (Md. 1981) 
(noting that other courts find mutual mistake without a finding of “mutual misconception of 
basic fact”). 
16  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see, e.g., Steiner v. 
Am. Friends of Lubavitch (Chabad), 177 A.3d 1246, 1255 (D.C. 2018) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152); see also discussion infra Section IV.A. 
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leasee, shared the mistake with the releasor.17 Releasees must surely claim that 
they were not mistaken about the releasor’s injuries but were contracting to 
avoid further litigation and added expense. Some courts recognize the doctrine 
of unilateral mistake generally,18 but courts usually do not explicitly address 
application of that doctrine.19 
Courts also do not acknowledge the releasor’s conscious ignorance. With 
either mutual or unilateral mistake doctrine, there is no mistake if the injured 
party was aware or should have been aware of his or her lack of knowledge 
with regard to the extent of the injuries.20 This is a barrier for the injured party 
to successfully claim mistake because the injured party, as a sentient soul and 
given the vagaries of the human body, should know that he or she may not 
know the injuries or their consequences relating to the incident with any degree 
of certainty. The injured party knows that he or she does not know. Yet, courts 
rarely acknowledge this as a barrier for the injured party.21 
Finally, some courts do not give respect to the language of the written re-
lease in which the releasor assumes the risk of unknown injuries and conse-
quences. Many personal injury releases state that the release is in exchange for 
the agreed compensation and that the release is for all liability for all injuries, 
known and unknown, relating to the incident involving the injuries.22 By this 
language the releasor assumes the risk of any injury not yet discovered at the 
time of the signing of the release. Mutual and unilateral mistake doctrine pro-
vides that the doctrine is not available to one who assumes the risk of the mis-
take even if there is a mistake.23 
Many courts attempt to minimize the effect of this release language by 
wrapping the consideration of the written document into the mistake analysis. 
Rather than analyzing whether the writing is reasonably susceptible to the two 
interpretations urged by the parties and then considering surrounding circum-
                                                        
17  See, e.g., Gleason, 623 P.2d at 385–86 (describing how the injured party survived a mo-
tion for summary judgment without discussion of mistake regarding the other party). 
18  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153; see also Greene v. Ablon, 794 F.3d 
133, 147–48 (1st Cir. 2015) (explaining the doctrine of unilateral mistake is disfavored but 
does exist in Massachusetts); Gamewell Mfg., Inc., v. HVAC Supply, Inc., 715 F.2d 112, 
116 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that a unilateral mistake as stated in § 153 is recognized as a 
part of federal law). 
19  But see Maglin v. Tschannerl, 800 A.2d 486, 490 (Vt. 2002) (noting the injured party pre-
sents a case of unilateral mistake, not mutual mistake). 
20  See, e.g., Greene, 794 F.3d at 148 (applying Mass. law) (relying in part on RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b). 
21  See Christensen v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 12 F.3d 980, 989 (10th Cir. 1993) (relying on 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b) to deny claim of mistake in personal injury 
release setting); see also discussion infra Section IV.B. 
22  See Maglin, 800 A.2d at 487. For other release examples see infra Part I. 
23  See, e.g., Brandt v. MIT Dev. Corp., 552 F. Supp. 2d 304, 323 (D. Conn. 2008) (relying 
on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(a) to refuse to set aside settlement agree-
ment); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(a); see also discussion infra Sec-
tion IV.C. 
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stances to interpret the words of the writing,24 some courts seem to be swayed 
by the releasor’s hindsight claim that he or she did not intend to release any-
thing with regard to unknown injuries and do not give respect to the words used 
in the release itself.25 Other courts create a separate analysis as a second stage 
of the mistake analysis to determine whether the release itself was “fairly and 
knowingly” made, thus focusing, at least in part, on the substantive fairness of 
the deal.26 
The courts who apply the traditional contract doctrines in untraditional 
ways are guided by a host of motivations such as a desire to have the wrongdo-
er compensate the injured party in harmony with tort law theory. Some courts 
are motivated by a belief that the complexity of the human body creates a situa-
tion in which people cannot possibly understand what they are doing when they 
sign releases dealing with unknown injuries.27 Some courts are concerned that 
the release is the product of unequal ability and bargaining strength.28 Indeed, 
some courts seem motivated by compassion to protect releasors29 even when 
those releasors are represented by counsel at the time they entered into the re-
lease.30 
A few courts have refused to treat personal injury releases more favorably 
than other contracts. These courts find no persuasive reason to tilt the playing 
field to assist personal injury releasors in avoiding releases.31 
Courts’ idiosyncratic treatment of personal injury releases is not new. Re-
gardless of the validity of the underlying assumptions and presumptions that 
motivated courts of the previous century,32 courts today should look with new 
                                                        
24  See discussion infra Section IV.C. 
25  See, e.g., Ranta v. Rake, 421 P.2d 747, 750–53 (Idaho 1966); see also discussion infra 
Section V.C. 
26  See, e.g., Finch v. Carlton, 524 P.2d 898, 901 (Wash. 1974) (en banc); see also discussion 
infra Section V.D. 
27  See, e.g., Clancy v. Pacenti, 145 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ill. App. Ct. 1957) (“[T]he most com-
plicated and mysterious of all the things that are upon or inhabit the earth.”); see discussion 
infra Section VI.C. 
28  See discussion infra Part VI. 
29  See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 611–12 (4th ed. 2004) (“Courts have often been 
torn between sympathy for the injured party and the policy favoring compromise as a means 
of settling claims, and they have been swayed by many factors, such as unfairness, that are 
not germane to the issue of avoidance for mutual mistake.”). See also Bernstein v. Kapneck, 
430 A.2d 602, 605 (Md. 1981) (“On the other side there are considerations, largely stem-
ming from compassion, which importune the larger number of courts to treat seemingly un-
ambiguous and freely entered into personal injury releases as sui generis, so as to justify 
their permitting the releasor to renege on his bargain.”). 
30  See, e.g., Gleason v. Guzman, 623 P.2d 378, 380, 387 (Colo. 1981) (the injured party’s 
guardian was represented by counsel); see also Witt v. Watkins, 579 P.2d 1065, 1067–68 
(Alaska 1978) (explaining the same). 
31  See, e.g., Bernstein, 430 A.2d at 607; Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling Co. of Or., 366 
P.2d 527, 530 (Or. 1961); see also discussion infra Section V.E. 
32  See Dan B. Dobbs, Conclusiveness of Personal Injury Settlements: Basic Problems, 41 
N.C. L. REV. 665, 704–05 (1963); Harold C. Havighurst, Problems Concerning Settlement 
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eyes upon the question of whether personal injury releasors should enjoy more 
favorable treatment than other contracting parties. Courts should not continue 
to rely on approaches first adopted many decades ago without a fresh policy 
analysis. 
Courts may conclude, as some courts have done in the past, that there is no 
good reason to provide greater contractual protection to an injured releasor who 
now claims that he or she did not know or understand the injury suffered.33 
Perhaps the vagaries of bodily injuries in the twenty-first century are not so 
mysterious that they cannot be contemplated and understood—at least with the 
assistance of counsel. Perhaps the goal of tort law that seeks to ensure the 
wrongdoer compensates the injured does not require that personal injury releas-
es be treated more favorably than more typical agreements in the mainstream of 
commerce. Perhaps contracting parties who sign releases for personal injuries 
need no special protection as the result of being weaker in ability or having a 
lesser bargaining position. Perhaps compassion alone cannot justify such spe-
cial treatment. Such a conclusion means that claims of mistake will rarely suc-
ceed because the injured party will not have suffered a mistake at the time of 
contracting and, in any event, assumed the risk of any mistake by the language 
of the release and by conscious ignorance.34 
A releasor’s plea is not always doomed, however. All other contract avoid-
ance doctrines are available as they are for any contract scenario. If such a par-
ty can prove fraud or duress, for example, a court may look favorably on the 
releasor’s claim that the release should be set aside.35 In addition, a releasor to-
day has at hand the unconscionability doctrine, a doctrine that was not well-
recognized when the courts began addressing personal injury releases under the 
banner of the mistake doctrine.36 In some cases a court might conclude that a 
personal injury release was unconscionable at the time of formation and thus 
should not be enforced. 
A court, after careful policy analysis, may conclude that injured parties 
should receive additional protection if they seek to avoid releases on the basis 
of newly discovered or newly understood injuries. Such a conclusion does not 
lead inexorably to a court blindly following past practice and attempting to 
                                                                                                                                
Agreements, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 283, 307 (1958); Eugene J. Keefe, Validity of Releases Exe-
cuted Under Mistake of Fact, 14 FORDHAM L. REV. 135, 136 (1945). 
33  See discussion infra Section V.E; see also Bernstein, 430 A.2d at 606 (“[O]ur society will 
be best served by adherence to the traditional methodology . . . .”). 
34  See discussion infra Sections VII.A and VII.B. 
35  See, e.g., Ford v. Phillips, 994 N.Y.S.2d 688, 691 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (“[A] motion to 
dismiss a complaint based solely upon a release should be denied when the plaintiff alleges 
fraud or duress in the release’s procurement.”) (citation omitted). 
36  See discussion infra Section VII.C. See generally Richard L. Barnes, Rediscovering Sub-
jectivity in Contracts: Adhesion and Unconscionability, 66 LA. L. REV. 123, 149–51 (2005) 
(discussing the origin and development of the doctrine); Colleen McCullough, Comment, 
Unconscionability as a Coherent Legal Concept, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 779, 781 (2016) (dis-
cussing the origin and development of the unconscionability doctrine). 
19 NEV. L.J. 535, GIESEL 4/25/2019  8:36 PM 
542 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:2  
shove the square peg of personal injury releases into the round hole of tradi-
tional mistake and other contract doctrines. Nor should it mean that such a 
court should engage in a bare analysis of the substantive fairness of the deal. 
If a court concludes that personal injury releasors should be treated more 
favorably than other contractors, the court should create a stand-alone process 
analysis akin to that used with releases of certain federal rights. Releases of cer-
tain federal rights, such as Title VII rights, must be knowing and voluntary.37 
Federal courts have delineated factors to analyze and the evidence to consider 
in determining whether a release of federal rights is knowing and voluntary.38 If 
an injured party knowingly and voluntarily entered into the release, no substan-
tive fairness analysis should second guess the deal struck by the parties.39 This 
approach provides added protection to the individual releasor while also honor-
ing the basic tenets of contract law. Such an approach is forthright, and its ra-
tionale can be clear. Even so, a releasor will not often be able to shoulder the 
burden of proving that the release was not made knowingly and voluntarily, es-
pecially if that party was represented by counsel at the time the injured party 
signed the release.40 
Ultimately, in very many situations, injured parties must be held to the re-
lease they signed because such releasor signed in exchange for prompt pay-
ment; agreed to the exchange knowing that he or she might learn later of inju-
ries or effects not realized at the time of the deal; and signed a clear and 
understandable document which placed the risk of unknown injuries and con-
sequences on the releasor. 
I. THE SETTING: THE TYPICAL CASE 
In the typical case in which this sort of claim arises, a person is injured and 
then enters into an agreement relinquishing all claims relating to the incident.41 
The release often states that the injured person relinquishes claims for all inju-
ries relating to the incident whether those injuries are known or unknown.42 For 
example, in Maglin v. Tschannerl, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed a re-
lease with the following language: 
For the sole consideration of $500.00 . . . the undersigned hereby releases and 
forever discharges [defendant] from any and all claims . . . causes of action or 
suits of any kind or nature whatsoever, and particularly on account of all inju-
ries, known and unknown, both to the person and the property, which have re-
                                                        
37  See discussion infra Part VIII. 
38  See, e.g., Myricks v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 480 F.3d 1036, 1040 (11th Cir. 2007). 
39  See id. at 1042–43. 
40  See discussion infra Part VIII. 
41  See, e.g., Maglin v. Tschannerl, 800 A.2d 486, 487 (Vt. 2002) (describing how plaintiff 
thinking she suffered whiplash in an automobile collision, signed a release of “all injuries, 
known and unknown” in exchange for $500 and then later discovered that her injuries were 
more significant). 
42  Id. 
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sulted or may in the future develop from an accident which occurred on or about 
the 12th day of March, 1996.43 
And in Sanger v. Yellow Cab Co., Inc., the Missouri Supreme Court quoted 
the release before it in part as follows: 
FOR THE SOLE AND ONLY CONSIDERATION . . . to me/us paid, . . . , I/we 
hereby release and discharge . . . [the tortfeasor] from all claims of any kind or 
character which I/we have or may have against him or them, and especially be-
cause of all damages, losses or injury to persons or property, or both, whether 
known or unknown, developed, or undeveloped, resulting or to result from acci-
dent on or about September 18, 1969, . . . , and I/we hereby acknowledge full 
settlement and satisfaction of all claims of whatever kind or character which 
I/we may have against him or them by reason of the above mentioned damages, 
losses or injuries.44 
In the typical case, after the injured party has signed the release and re-
ceived the money that is the consideration supporting the release, the injured 
party claims that the release should be set aside because his or her injuries are 
not what the party thought at the time the release was signed. Bronson v. Han-
sel presents a good example.45 In Bronson, the plaintiff was injured in an auto-
mobile collision, after which she suffered from neck pain and was treated for a 
                                                        
43  Id. (emphasis provided by the court). 
44  Sanger v. Yellow Cab Co., 486 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Mo. 1972) (en banc) (emphasis added). 
A sample release presented as one used by a common insurer and found online releases par-
ties: 
[F]rom any and every claim, . . . in any way growing out of any and all personal injuries and 
consequences thereof, including, but not limited to, . . . any injuries which may exist but which 
at this time are unknown and unanticipated and which may develop at some time in the future, 
all unforeseen developments arising from known injuries, . . . resulting or to result from an acci-
dent that occurred . . . . 
See Release in Full of All Claims, MILLER & ZOIS, LLC, https://www.millerandzois.com/files 
/release-geico.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WG9-ADZU] (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). Another re-
lease presented as one used by another common insurer and found online releases parties: 
“[F]rom any and all actions, causes of action, claims and demands, damages, costs, loss of 
services, expenses and compensation on account of or in any way arising out of any and all 
known and unknown personal injuries and property damage resulting or to result from an 
accident which occurred . . . .” Release and Settlement of Claim, MILLER & ZOIS, LLC, https: 
//www.millerandzois.com/files/release-hartford.pdf [https://perma.cc/98R5-GUZL] (last vis-
ited Oct. 22, 2018). For other examples, see Full Release of all Claims with Indemnity, 
MILLER & ZOIS, LLC, https://www.millerandzois.com/files/release-progressive.pdf [https://p 
erma.cc/9TYE-&7YHL] (last visited Oct. 22, 2018); Parents/Guardian Release and Indem-
nity Agreement, MILLER & ZOIS, LLC, https://www.millerandzois.com/files/release-usaa.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3VLL-D8K2] (last visited Oct. 22, 2018); and Release of all Claims, 
MILLER & ZOIS, LLC, https://www.millerandzois.com/files/release-zurich.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/ZKF4-J2XS] (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). Releases that apply by their terms to known and 
unknown injuries and consequences are not a new phenomenon. See Dobbs, supra note 32, 
at 672 (noting that releases at that time, the early 1960s, contained such language). 
45  See generally Bronson v. Hansel, 913 N.Y.S.2d 851, 852 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). 
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strain.46 She signed a release, entitled, “Release of All Claims,” in exchange for 
approximately $1,050.47 The release stated that the plaintiff was releasing all 
claims “growing out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unfor-
seen[,] bodily and personal injuries and property damage and the consequences 
thereof resulting from the accident” and that the plaintiff “declare(s) and repre-
sent(s) that there may be unknown or unanticipated injuries resulting from the 
. . . accident . . . and[,] in making [the r]elease[,] it is understood and agreed 
that [it] is intended to include such injuries.”48 Later, the injured party discov-
ered that she suffered a herniated disc as a result of the accident.49 The plaintiff 
sued, claiming that the release should not be a barrier to her action to recover 
for her injuries because she had signed the release when mistaken about her in-
jury.50 
II. CONTRACT DOCTRINE APPLIES 
A settlement agreement is a contract, and thus traditional contract law prin-
ciples apply.51 A release is, in effect, a settlement agreement52 and so, likewise, 
                                                        
46  Id. at 852. Many of the cases in which the issue arise involve automobile collisions but, of 
course, the issue can arise in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Gleason v. Guzman, 623 P.2d 
378, 379–80 (Colo. 1981) (describing how vending machine fell on the injured party). 
47  Bronson, 913 N.Y.S.2d at 852. 
48  Id. 
49  Id. 
50  Id. See Hicks v. Sparks, No. 522, 2013, 2014 WL 1233698, at *2 (Del. Mar. 25, 2014). In 
Hicks, the plaintiff was in an automobile collision and suffered headaches and neck pain as a 
result. Id. at *1. After settling her claim for $4,000, she began experiencing additional pain 
which led to a diagnosis of cervical disk herniation requiring surgery. Id. The plaintiff sued, 
claiming that the release should not be a bar to her recovery because at the time of the re-
lease she had been mistaken about her injury. Id. at *1–2. She had believed the injury to be a 
cervical strain when in reality it was a herniated disc. Id. at *3. The release the plaintiff 
signed stated in part that the plaintiff “declares and represents that the injuries are or may be 
permanent and that recovery therefrom is uncertain and indefinite.” Id.; see also Delpino v. 
Spinks, No. N13C-03-288, 2014 WL 4348236, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2014). The 
plaintiff in Delpino was involved in an automobile collision. Id. He suffered from shoulder 
pain which he believed to be a strain. Id. In exchange for $750, he signed a release provided 
by the defendant’s insurer which stated: 
It is understood and agreed that this settlement is in full compromise of a doubtful and disputed 
claim as to both questions of liability and as to the nature and extent of the injuries . . . it is un-
derstood and agreed that the undersigned rely(ies) [sic] wholly upon the undersigned’s judg-
ment, belief and knowledge as to the nature, extent, effect and duration of said injuries and lia-
bility therefore.  
Id. Later, he discovered that he had suffered a labral tear which required shoulder surgery. 
Id. at *2. The plaintiff sued and when the defendant moved for the matter to be dismissed on 
the basis of the release, the plaintiff claimed that the release was the product of a mutual mis-
take such that it should not be enforced. Id. 
51  See May v. Anderson, 119 P.3d 1254, 1257 (Nev. 2005) (“Because a settlement agree-
ment is a contract, its construction and enforcement are governed by principles of contract 
law.”) (citing Reichelt v. Urban Inv. & Dev. Co., 611 F. Supp. 952, 954 (N.D. Ill. 1985)); 
see also Washington v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., No. 17 CV 2343, 2018 WL 558501, at *4 (N.D. 
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traditional contract law principles apply,53 including traditional contract for-
mation54 and interpretation principles.55 Once a party proves a release has been 
entered into, courts require the releasor to shoulder the burden of proving that 
the release should not be honored but rather should be set aside.56 
III. CONTRACT MISTAKE DOCTRINE 
Injured parties throughout the years have sought to avoid releases on the 
basis that the injured parties were not aware of or did not fully understand the 
injuries suffered when they entered into the releases as part of settlements of 
claims and in exchange for remuneration.57 Injured parties have claimed that 
that the releases should not be enforced because the parties to the releases 
shared a mutual mistake about the injuries.58 
                                                                                                                                
Ill. Jan. 24, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-2626 (7th Cir. July 26, 2018) (“A settlement 
agreement is a contract, and it is governed by principles of state contract law.”). 
52  See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Fla. Evergreen Foliage, 744 A.2d 457, 462 (Del. 
1999) (“A release is a form of contract with the consideration typically being the surrender 
of a claim or cause of action in exchange for the payment of funds or surrender or an offset-
ting claim.”). 
53  See Washington, 2018 WL 558501, at *4 (“A release within a settlement agreement is 
also governed by contract law.”). 
54  See Chaganti & Assocs. v. Nowotny, 470 F.3d 1215, 1221 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 
551 U.S. 1131 (2007) (“Basic principles of contract formation govern the existence and en-
forcement of the alleged settlement.”). 
55  See Powell v. Omnicom, 497 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2007) (“A settlement agreement is a 
contract that is interpreted according to general principles of contract law.”). 
56  See, e.g., Witt v. Watkins, 579 P.2d 1065, 1069–70 (Alaska 1978) (“Once the party rely-
ing on a release establishes that it was given with an understanding of the nature of the in-
strument, the burden is on the releasor to show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
release should be set aside.”) (citation omitted); Ranta v. Rake, 421 P.2d 747, 752 (Idaho 
1966) (“[T]he releasor has the burden of proving the reasons for setting aside the release by 
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence.”). 
57  For historical discussion of this phenomenon, see generally Dobbs, supra note 32. See 
Joseph Conder, Comment, The Enforceability of Personal Injury Releases: Gleason v. Guz-
man, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 277–78 (1983); Michael A. Plotz, Comment, Personal Injury 
Releases May Be Set Aside Under the Doctrine of Mutual Mistake When the Injury Later 
Sued for Was Unknown at the Time of Signing: Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. 
1990), 32 S. TEX. L. REV. 311, 314–24 (1991); Robert A. Radcliffe, Note, When Should the 
Trier of Fact Determine the Validity of Personal Injury Releases?—Bennett v. Shinoda Flo-
ral, Inc., 108 Wash. 2d 386, 739 P.2d 648 (1987), 63 WASH. L. REV. 749, 750–53 (1988); 
For a list of cases see Michael DiSabatino, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules as to Avoid-
ance of Release of Personal Injury Claim on Ground of Mistake as to Nature and Extent of 
Injuries, 13 A.L.R. 4th 686 (1982). 
58  For a discussion of the contract mistake doctrine generally, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Mis-
take in Contract Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1573 (2003); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Disclosure in 
Contract Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1645, 1684–86 (2003); and Val D. Ricks, American Mutual 
Mistake: Half-Civilian Mongrel, Consideration Reincarnate, 58 LA. L. REV. 663, 664–76 
(1998). For general discussion about the mistake doctrine in contracts as well as the criminal 
law’s mistake doctrine, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, ALLEVIATING MISTAKES: REVERSAL 
AND FORGIVENESS FOR FLAWED PERCEPTIONS (2004). 
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Today, there are two recognized mistake doctrines that can cause a court to 
refuse to enforce a contract: mutual mistake and unilateral mistake. The stated 
definitions of the doctrines across jurisdictions vary.59 The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts, with regard to both types of mistake, defines a “mistake” as 
“a belief that is not in accord with the facts.”60 A comment notes that “the erro-
neous belief must relate to the facts as they exist at the time of the making of 
the contract” and that a “party’s prediction or judgment as to events to occur in 
the future, even if erroneous,” is not a mistake.61 
The Restatement provides with regard to mutual mistake that: 
1. both parties must share the mistake, 
2. the mistake must be “as to a basic assumption on which the contract 
was made[,]” 
3. the mistake must have a “material effect on the agreed exchange of 
performances,” and 
4. the party seeking relief must not bear the risk of the mistake.62 
Unilateral mistake differs from mutual mistake in that only one party to the 
contract must be mistaken. In addition, “the effect of the mistake is such that 
enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable,” or that the other party 
caused or had reason to know of the mistake.63 
                                                        
59  Some jurisdictions adopt the Restatement approach. See, e.g., Rotunda v. Marriott Int’l, 
Inc., 123 A.3d 980, 984 n.4 (D.C. 2015); Hart v. Arnold, 884 A.2d 316, 333 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2005). Other jurisdictions have their own approach. See, e.g., Anderson Cty. v. Preston, 804 
S.E.2d 282, 297 (S.C. Ct. App. 2017) (“A contract may be rescinded for mistake, if justice so 
requires, in the following circumstances: (1) whe[n] the mistake is mutual and is in reference 
to the facts or supposed facts upon which the contract is based; (2) whe[n] the mistake is mu-
tual and consists in the omission or insertion of some material element affecting the subject 
matter or the terms and stipulations of the contract, inconsistent with the true agreement of 
the parties; (3) whe[n] the mistake is unilateral and has been induced by the fraud, deceit, 
misrepresentation, concealment, or imposition of the party opposed to the rescission, without 
negligence on the part of the party claiming rescission; or (4) whe[n] the mistake is unilateral 
and is accompanied by very strong and extraordinary circumstances which would make it a 
wrong to enforce the agreement, sustained by competent evidence of the clearest kind.”) 
(quoting King v. Oxford, 318 S.E.2d 125, 128 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984)). 
With regard to unilateral mistake, see Whistleblower 4496-15W v. Comm’r, No. 4496-15W, 
2017 WL 2304309, at *7 (T.C. May 25, 2017) (“A party’s unilateral mistake, by contrast, 
generally will not suffice to invalidate a contract unless it was induced in some way by the 
other party . . .”). See Gessin Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. 95 Wall Assocs., LLC, 903 N.Y.S.2d 
26, 29 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (“[A] court sitting in equity can rescind a contract for unilat-
eral mistake if failure to rescind would unjustly enrich one party at the other’s expense, and 
the parties can be returned to the status quo ante without prejudice.”) (citation omitted). But 
see Vandenberg v. Brunswick Corp., 90 N.E.3d 1048, 1057 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (“A unilat-
eral mistake is insufficient to invalidate an agreement compromising and settling a disputed 
claim.”) (quoting Cole Taylor Bank v. Cole Taylor Bank, 586 N.E.2d 775, 783 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1992)). 
60  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
61  See id. § 151 cmt. a. 
62  See id. § 152. 
63  See id. § 153. 
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With both mutual mistake and unilateral mistake, a party bears the risk of 
the mistake and cannot use the mistake doctrine to his or her benefit in three 
situations. First, a party cannot use the mistake doctrine if the parties have allo-
cated the risk to that party by agreement; in such a situation the parties have, in 
advance, confronted the possibility that there could be errors but deal with how 
that should be handled by agreement.64 The agreement that a party entered into 
while mistaken can, and usually does, itself allocate the risk and saves the doc-
ument’s validity.65 Second, a party cannot use the mistake doctrine if that party 
entered into the agreement with “conscious ignorance.”66 A party is “con-
scious[ly] ignorant” if the party knows he or she lacks information about the 
issue to which the mistake relates but enters into the agreement anyway.67 
Third, a court may place the risk on a party because “it is reasonable in the cir-
cumstances to do so.”68 
IV. TRADITIONAL APPLICATION OF CONTRACT DOCTRINE TO THE TYPICAL 
PERSONAL INJURY RELEASE SITUATION 
A personal injury releasor has four tremendous hurdles blocking the way to 
success of a mutual mistake claim. First, the releasor must prove that the mis-
take at the heart of the basic assumption of the deal is about the facts as they 
existed at the time the release was entered into and not simply a speculation or 
prediction of the future.69 Second, the injured party must prove that the injured 
party and the releasee shared a mistake about the injured party’s injuries.70 
Third, the injured party cannot have been acting in conscious ignorance, and 
fourth, the agreement cannot have placed the risk on the injured party by its 
own terms.71 
A. A Shared Mistake of Fact and Not a Speculation or Prediction 
A party seeking to avoid a personal injury release likely cannot prove that 
he or she acted with “a belief that is not in accord with the facts.”72 A logical 
view of the situation at the time an injured party agrees to a release in exchange 
for recompense is that the injured party is speculating that his or her injuries 
will not become something other than what the injured party knows at the time 
of the signing of the release. An injured party weighs what he knows of his in-
juries, the amount of money being offered, and the value to that party of having 
                                                        
64  See id. § 154(a), cmt. b. 
65  See, e.g., Lenawee Cty. Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Mich. 1982). 
66  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 cmt. c. 
67  See id. § 154(b). 
68  See id. § 154(c). 
69  See id. § 151 cmt. a. 
70  See id. § 152 cmt. a. 
71  See id. § 154(a), (b), cmt. c. 
72  See id. § 151; see also discussion supra Part III. 
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that money immediately without the hassle of further haggling, lawsuits, and 
such. 
Even if an injured party can prove that her or she was mistaken, in the vast 
majority of situations that party cannot prove that the other party to the release 
shares the mistake. The releasee, too, is speculating. The releasee hopes that the 
injuries and their consequences do not change but seeks to settle the matter so 
that there is certainty and closure short of extended litigation.73 
Often the injured party has legal counsel.74 The basic professional obliga-
tion of competence requires such counsel to bring home to the injured party the 
possibility of later discovered physical effects of the precipitating event.75 If an 
injured party with the benefit of the advice of counsel enters into a release as 
part of the settlement of a matter, a successful claim of mutual mistake is hard 
to fathom. 
B. The Injured Party Has the Risk of Mistake by Conscious Ignorance 
In the vast majority of these situations the injured party cannot survive the 
conscious ignorance analysis. This is especially true when the injured party has 
the benefit of the advice of an attorney at the time of the signing of the release. 
In Wood v. Boynton, a classic conscious ignorance case, a woman brought a 
stone to a shop to sell because she needed money.76 Neither she nor the shop-
keeper knew what the stone was, but both thought it was a topaz.77 The shop-
keeper bought the stone for a dollar.78 Later, the parties discovered that the 
stone was a diamond.79 The seller of the stone claimed mistake and asked the 
court to set aside the contract of sale.80 The court refused, noting that the seller 
chose to sell without further investigation of its composition.81 The seller sold 
knowing she did not know with certainty the composition of the stone.82 
In the release setting, to avoid the conscious ignorance bar, injured parties 
must claim that they did not perceive the uncertainty of their medical condition. 
Given the society in which injured parties live—a society which bombards 
                                                        
73  See, e.g., Boccarossa v. Watkins, 313 A.2d 135, 137 (R.I. 1973) (describing how releasee 
did not share the mistake); Maglin v. Tschannerl, 800 A.2d 486, 490 (Vt. 2002) (explaining 
that at most the injured party has proved unilateral mistake). 
74  See, e.g., Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452, 1454 (9th Cir. 1988). 
75  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“A lawyer shall 
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representa-
tion.”). 
76  Wood v. Boynton, 25 N.W. 42, 43 (Wis. 1885). 
77  Id. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. at 44. 
81  Id. (“If she chose to sell it without further investigation as to its intrinsic value . . . she 
cannot repudiate the sale because it is afterwards ascertained that she made a bad bargain.”). 
82  Id. 
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people with information of all sorts, including medical knowledge—this claim 
seems far-fetched. As one court has noted: “There was, of course, at the time of 
settlement negotiations, as in every personal injury case, a conscious uncertain-
ty regarding the medical outcome of the victim’s case. At the time of settle-
ment, both parties undertook a risk that the resolution of the uncertainty might 
be unfavorable.”83 
In addition, many injured parties enter releases in exchange for compensa-
tion only after consulting an attorney.84 Such an attorney, if competent, surely 
explained to the injured party the possibility that not all injuries or effects of 
injuries had manifested at the time the injured party considered the release.85 
Thus, the attorney made the injured party aware of his or her ignorance about 
injuries. The involvement of an attorney makes an injured party’s claim of lack 
of conscious ignorance particularly suspect. A rational explanation for the situ-
ation is that the injured party, after consultation with counsel, understood that 
further injury or complications could occur and yet that party preferred the cer-
tainty of the payment in the short term rather than the chance of a payment in 
the long term after costly litigation.86 
C. The Release Places the Risk of Mistake on the Injured Party 
In many situations mistake doctrine should not be available to the personal 
injury releasor, regardless of the releasor’s knowledge of injury, because the 
release placed the risk of any mistake regarding injuries on the releasor. When 
a contract allocates the risk of a particular type of mistake to a party, that party 
cannot rely on such a mistake to avoid the contract.87 A common scenario in 
which this issue arises is when a purchaser of land seeks to have the contract 
for sale set aside on the basis of a mistake about the possible uses of the land.88 
Often such contracts provide that the purchaser is buying the property “as is.”89 
Courts find that purchasers cannot rely on a mistake as to possible land use be-
                                                        
83  Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah 1985) (citation omitted). 
84  See, e.g., Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452, 1454–55 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining 
that an attorney was consulted before the release was signed); Gleason v. Guzman, 623 P.2d 
378, 380 (Colo. 1981) (also explaining an attorney was consulted before the release was 
signed). 
85  This explanation would be required by the duty of competence all attorneys owe to their 
clients. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“A lawyer 
shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the le-
gal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representa-
tion.”). 
86  See Harbor Ins. Co. v. Stokes, 45 F.3d 499, 503 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding party cannot 
claim mistake because party knew the matter had been appealed and a decision could be ren-
dered at any time; settlement was made in conscious ignorance). 
87  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also dis-
cussion supra Part III. 
88  See, e.g., Lenawee Cty. Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203, 205, 210 (Mich. 
1982). 
89  See, e.g., id. at 210. 
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cause the “as is” language of the contracts placed the risk of the mistake on the 
purchasers.90 
Typical personal injury releases refer expressly to the possibility of un-
known injuries or effects on the releasor.91 The court in Ranta v. Rake reviewed 
a particularly explicit release which referred to “all known and unknown, fore-
seen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries and property damage and the 
consequences thereof,” and then continued: 
 It is understood and agreed that this settlement is the compromise of a doubtful 
and disputed claim, and that the payment made is not to be construed as an ad-
mission of liability on the part of the party or parties hereby released, and that 
said releasees deny liability therefor and intend merely to avoid litigation and 
buy their peace. 
 
The undersigned hereby declare(s) and represent(s) that the injuries sustained 
are or may be permanent and progressive and that recovery therefrom is uncer-
tain and indefinite and in making this Release it is understood and agreed, that 
the undersigned rely(ies) wholly upon the undersigned’s judgment, belief and 
knowledge of the nature, extent, affect and duration of said injuries and liability 
therefor and is made without reliance upon any statement or representation of 
the party or parties hereby released or their representatives or by any physician 
or surgeon by them employed. 
. . . . 
THE UNDERSIGNED HAS READ THE FOREGOING RELEASE AND 
FULLY UNDERSTANDS IT.92 
Regardless of whether the document states that the party has read it, a party 
who signs a document is held to have read it.93 As the Supreme Court stated 
long ago in Upton v. Tribilcock, “It will not do for a man to enter into a con-
tract, and, when called upon to respond to its obligations, to say that he did not 
read it when he signed it, or did not know what it contained.”94 
The language of this Ranta release or any other typical release is such that 
the result of any interpretation analysis must conclude that the release clearly 
places the risk of unknown injuries on the injured party. In modern contract 
law, a court determines a party’s assent to an agreement by looking at the ex-
ternal or objective manifestations of intentions.95 The focus is on what the other 
                                                        
90  See, e.g., id.; Atkins v. Kirkpatrick, 823 S.W.2d 547, 553 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). 
91  See supra Part I for examples of releases. 
92  Ranta v. Rake, 421 P.2d 747, 749 (Idaho 1966). 
93  See Giaccone v. Canopius U.S. Ins. Co., 133 F. Supp. 3d 668, 674 (D.N.J. 2015) (apply-
ing N.J. law) (“Indeed, signing a contract creates a conclusive presumption that the signer 
read, understood, and assented to its terms.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Anzueto v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 357 F. Supp. 2d 27, 30 (D.D.C. 
2004) (“[I]t is well established that a person has a duty to read a contract before he signs it. If 
he had the opportunity to read it, he is bound by its terms regardless of whether he thought 
he was signing an actual contract.”) (citation omitted). 
94  Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50 (1875). 
95  See, e.g., Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954); see also MURRAY, supra note 
2, § 31, at 62. 
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party would reasonably believe as a result of the party’s manifestations of as-
sent.96 The objective approach means that when a court evaluates what the par-
ties intended by the words used in the document they signed, the court should 
focus on how each party’s words and actions would be reasonably perceived by 
the other party.97 
A court entertaining a releasor’s plea to not enforce a release of “all inju-
ries, known and unknown,”98 acts with this objective view as background. Even 
assuming the parol evidence rule is not an obstacle to the admission of evi-
dence relating to the deal struck,99 and with the court considering all evidence 
proffered by the releasor, the releasor has a difficult path to success in arguing 
that the words of the release should be interpreted to not place the risk of any 
mistake as to injuries squarely on the releasor.100 
When parties seek to have courts interpret the meaning of agreements, 
courts look to the writing and, often, to extrinsic evidence101 to interpret the 
writing and to determine whether the writing is reasonably susceptible to the 
meanings suggested by the parties.102 Some courts give the writing more weight 
                                                        
96  See FARNSWORTH, supra note 29, § 3.6, at 115 (“By the end of the nineteenth century, the 
objective theory had become ascendant and courts universally accept it today.”); see also 
Greene v. Ablon, 794 F.3d 133, 147 (1st Cir. 2015) (applying Mass. law) (“Although mutual 
assent is often misleadingly referred to as a ‘meeting of the minds,’ the formation of a valid 
contract under Massachusetts law requires objective, not subjective, intent.”) (citation omit-
ted). 
97  See Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814 (7th Cir. 1987) (“ ‘[I]ntent’ does 
not invite a tour through [the plaintiff’s] cranium, with [the plaintiff] as the guide.”); see also 
Westlake Invs., LLC v. MLP Mgmt., LLC, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1126 (S.D. Iowa 2012) 
(“Mutual assent is determined from objective evidence. When interpreting a settlement 
agreement the primary concern is to determine the intention of the parties; ‘[e]vidence of the 
parties’ mutual intent is what matters.’ ”) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Peak v. Adams, 
799 N.W.2d 535, 544 (Iowa 2011)). 
98  Maglin v. Tschannerl, 800 A.2d 486, 487 (Vt. 2002). 
99  See Bernstein v. Kapneck, 430 A.2d 602, 607 (Md. 1981) (“[P]arole [sic] evidence ordi-
narily is inadmissible to vary, alter or contradict a contract, including a release, that is com-
plete and unambiguous, in the absence of ‘fraud, accident or mutual mistake.’ ”) (quoting 
McLain v. Pernell, 258 A.2d 416, 418 (Md. 1969)); see generally Juanda Lowder Daniel, 
K.I.S.S. the Parol Evidence Rule Goodbye: Simplifying the Concept of Protecting the Par-
ties’ Written Agreement, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 227, 248 (2007) (discussing the rule and its 
exceptions). For a general discussion of the parol evidence rule, see MURRAY, supra note 2, 
§§ 83, 86, at 416, 442. 
100  Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., Inc., 239 F. 976, 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) 
(“[T]here is a critical breaking point . . . beyond which no language can be forced[.]”). 
101  See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1010 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(“External indicia of the parties’ intent other than written words are useful, and probably in-
dispensable, in interpreting contract terms. If each judge simply applied his own linguistic 
background and experience to the words of a contract, contracting parties would live in a 
most uncertain environment.”); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Con-
tracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 940–42 (1967) (describing how context gives words meaning). 
102  See, e.g., Mellon Bank, N.A., 619 F.2d at 1011 (“If a reasonable alternative interpretation 
is suggested, even though it may be alien to the judge’s linguistic experience, objective evi-
dence in support of that interpretation should be considered by the fact finder.”) (citation 
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and require a finding of ambiguity within the document itself before consider-
ing evidence other than the writing.103 
A typical generic contract interpretation approach is presented in Engi-
neered Abrasives, Inc. v. American Machine Products and Service, Inc.104 In 
that case, the parties settled a matter in a commercial setting that included a re-
lease provision in which Engineered Abrasives agreed as follows: 
[Engineered Abrasives] . . . hereby releases [American] . . . from any . . . claims, 
. . . liabilities, obligations, damages, costs, attorneys’ fees, expenses, actions, 
and/or causes of action of every nature, . . . whether known or unknown, sus-
pected or unsuspected, which it ever had, now has, or may hereafter claim to 
have by reason of any matter, . . . whatsoever arising or occurring prior to and 
including the date of the Agreement, including but not limited to the claims and 
defenses set forth in the Action.105 
As part of this settlement and in exchange for the release, Engineered 
Abrasives was to receive $75,000, an injunction against slander by American 
Machine, and a $250,000 liquidated damages provision supporting the injunc-
tion.106 After the settlement, American Machine introduced the release in a sep-
arate trade secret matter in which Engineered Abrasives had obtained a 
$714,814 default judgment against American Machine, claiming that the re-
lease applied to this earlier matter.107 
Engineered Abrasives claimed that the release did not apply to the trade se-
cret matter, noting that the parties, in developing the settlement that included 
the release, did not discuss or refer to the trade secret matter and that the com-
pensation given in exchange for the release was only approximately one-tenth 
                                                                                                                                
omitted); see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. O’Kelley, 645 P.2d 767, 771 n.1 (Alaska 
1982) (rejecting approach that requires finding of ambiguity before extrinsic evidence can be 
considered to interpret). 
103  For example, in Fackler v. Powell, 891 N.E.2d 1091 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), the court stat-
ed: 
If the contract language is unambiguous and the intent of the parties is discernible from the writ-
ten contract, the court is to give effect to the terms of the contract. A contract is ambiguous if a 
reasonable person would find the contract subject to more than one interpretation; however, the 
terms of a contract are not ambiguous merely because the parties disagree as to their interpreta-
tion. When the contract terms are clear and unambiguous, the terms are conclusive and we do 
not construe the contract or look to extrinsic evidence, but will merely apply the contractual pro-
visions. 
Id. at 1096 (internal citations omitted); see also Washington v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., No. 17 
CV 2343, 2018 WL 558501, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-2626 
(7th Cir. July 26, 2018) (noting that the meaning of the document and the intention of the 
parties is gathered from the document alone); Bolling Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc’y, 
Inc., 475 A.2d 382, 385 (D.C. 1984) (“If the release is facially unambiguous, we must rely 
solely upon its language as providing the best objective manifestation of the parties’ in-
tent.”). 
104  Engineered Abrasives, Inc. v. Am. Mach. Prods. & Serv., Inc., 882 F.3d 650, 653 (7th 
Cir. 2018). 
105  Id. at 651–52. 
106  Id. at 651. 
107  Id. American Machine did so via Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Id. at 652. 
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of the amount of the default judgment.108 The court, applying Illinois law, af-
firmed the lower court’s finding that the release unambiguously applied to the 
trade secret matter.109 Because the writing was unambiguous, the court refused 
to consider evidence extrinsic to the writing, stating that “[c]ourts look to the 
language of the settlement agreement to determine the parties’ intent unless the 
agreement is ambiguous.”110 The court noted the significant discrepancy be-
tween the $75,000 settlement amount and the $714,814 default judgment, but 
stated that, because the document was not ambiguous, the parties’ reasoning in 
settling for so little was “outside the scope of a court’s inquiry.”111 
If a court applies traditional contract principles to the situation of personal 
injury releases, it is likely the court will determine that the releasor, by signing 
the release, agrees to release the other party regarding all injuries, even those 
unknown at the time of the signing of the release. The injured party takes on the 
risk of unknown injury in exchange for compensation and the extinguishment 
of the risk of receiving no compensation or less compensation later.112 
The language of the typical personal injury release is not unduly complex, 
nor is the entire transaction itself complex.113 The release document is typically 
not lengthy—only a page or two pages.114 While the releasee often controls 
language of the release, the releasor commonly negotiates the compensation 
with the releasee or the releasee’s representative.115 The injured party presents 
evidence of the injury that he or she claims resulted from the actions of the oth-
er party and the releasor and releasee or the releasee’s agent negotiate an ap-
                                                        
108  Id. at 652. 
109  Id. at 654–55. 
110  Id. at 653. 
111  Id. at 654–55. Note that Illinois courts treat personal injury releases very differently. See 
discussion infra Section V.B. For another example of a typical approach, see Goldberg v. 
Goldberg, 428 A.2d 469, 474–75 (Md. 1981) (“[W]here a contract is plain and unambigu-
ous, there is no room for construction, and it must be presumed that the parties meant what 
they expressed.”) (quoting Kasten Constr., v. Rod Enters., Inc., 301 A.2d 12, 18 (Md. 
1973)). 
112  See Hicks v. Sparks, No. 522, 2013, 2014 WL 1233698, at *2 (Del. Mar. 25, 2014) (“A 
release is a device by which parties seek to control the risk of the potential outcomes of liti-
gation. Releases are executed to resolve the claims the parties know about as well as those 
that are unknown or uncertain. Because litigation is inherently risky, a general release avoids 
the uncertainty, expenses, and delay of a potential trial.”). 
113  See the following sample releases: Full Release of All Claims with Indemnity, supra note 
44; Parents/Guardian Release and Indemnity Agreement, supra note 44; Release and Settle-
ment of Claim, supra note 44; Release in Full of All Claims, supra note 44; and Release of 
All Claims, supra note 44. 
114  All of the sample releases referenced in supra note 113 are one page with the exception 
of one which is two pages. 
115  See, e.g., Hicks, 2014 WL 1233698, at *1 (explaining the releasee initially offered Hicks 
$2000; Hicks countered with $7000; the releasee then offered $2500; Hicks countered with 
$5000; the releasee then offered $3000; Hicks reiterated a demand of $5000; the releasee 
then offered $4000 which Hicks accepted); Witt v. Watkins, 579 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Alaska 
1978) (noting release was signed five months after automobile collision and after negotiation 
of amount). 
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propriate amount without undue haste.116 The releasor then, often after consul-
tation with an attorney, signs the release.117 The releasor seeks money in the 
short term without further expense or delay while the releasee seeks to end the 
matter efficiently.118 In this situation, it is a difficult argument to assert that the 
proper interpretation of the words of the writing is that the risk of unknown in-
jury is not given to the releasor.119 
D. Traditional Application of the Unilateral Mistake Doctrine to the Typical 
Personal Injury Release Situation 
An injured party claiming unilateral mistake avoids the hurdle of proving 
that the mistake is shared, but encounters the similarly difficult hurdle of prov-
ing “a belief that is not in accord with the facts.”120 Likewise, an injured party 
claiming unilateral mistake would likely bear the risk of the mistake as the re-
sult of being consciously ignorant.121 As is true with a claim of mutual mistake, 
it is also very likely that the release puts the risk of the mistake on the injured 
party and thus renders the party unable to use the unilateral mistake doctrine.122 
In addition, the unilateral mistake doctrine, at least under the Restatement 
formulation, adds to the injured party’s burden by requiring that the mistake be 
caused by the other party, or that the other party have reason to know of the in-
jured party’s mistake or that enforcement of the release would be unconsciona-
ble.123 Unlike the stand-alone unconscionability doctrine which focuses on un-
                                                        
116  In Hicks, the automobile collision occurred in March and the release of the adverse par-
ty’s liability was signed in October. Hicks was treated by a physician and presented her inju-
ries to the representative of the releasee. The releasee initially offered Hicks $2000. Hicks 
countered with $7000. The releasee then offered $2500. Hicks countered with $5000. The 
releasee then offered $3000. Hicks reiterated a demand of $5000. The releasee then offered 
$4000 which Hicks accepted. Hicks, 2014 WL 1233698, at *1; see also Witt, 579 P.2d at 
1066–67 (release signed five months after automobile collision and after negotiation; infor-
mation about injury gained from treating physicians). 
117  See, e.g., Hicks, 2014 WL 1233698, at *1 (explaining Hicks consulted two attorneys who 
advised to wait at least a year); Simmons v. Blauw, 635 N.E.2d 601, 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) 
(noting attorney negotiated on plaintiff’s behalf). 
118  See generally Dobbs, supra note 32, at 665–66 (discussing the benefits of settlement in 
general). 
119  Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 623 (1944) (“The more 
bizarre and unusual an asserted interpretation is, the more convincing must be the testimony 
that supports it. At what point the court should cease listening to testimony that white is 
black and that a dollar is fifty cents is a matter for sound judicial discretion and common 
sense.”). 
120  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 151, 153 cmt. a, b (AM. LAW INST. 1981); 
see also discussion supra Part III and Section IV.A. 
121  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b); see also discussion supra Part III 
and Section IV.B. 
122  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(a); see also discussion supra Part III 
and Section IV.C. 
123  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153; see also discussion supra Part III. 
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conscionability at the time of the formation of the release,124 the focus of the 
unilateral mistake doctrine unconscionability analysis is the possible uncon-
scionable effect of enforcing the document.125 Injured parties, assuming they 
could prove mistake, might make a colorable claim that the effect of the release 
is unconscionable by presenting evidence that the injured party gave the release 
in exchange for a very small compensation in light of the ultimately discovered 
injuries of the releasor.126 
E. Conclusions about Traditional Application of the Mistake Doctrine 
If a court applies traditional contract doctrine, an injured party cannot often 
succeed in having a release rescinded. For both doctrines, the situation does not 
present a recognizable mistake, but instead presents a mistake in prediction or 
speculation. For mutual mistake, there is the added problem of the mistake not 
being shared. And with regard to both doctrines, the releasor has the risk of un-
known injury as a result of conscious ignorance and the language of the release 
itself. That language is usually clear and does not lend itself to an interpretation 
other than that the injured party releasor takes the risk that there are injuries or 
consequences that the releasor does not fully perceive or understand. 
V. COURTS’ TREATMENT OF PERSONAL INJURY RELEASES 
Courts struggle with applying mistake doctrine to personal injury releases 
in the situation of later claimed injuries. Courts have a difficult time determin-
ing whether the injured party was mistaken about a fact at the time of contract-
ing or, rather, simply speculating about the future, consciously ignorant of the 
true physical state of his or her body.127 Not only is the existence of a mistake a 
sticky wicket, the issue of the mutuality of the mistake is one not often ad-
dressed by the courts, although it is a requirement of the mutual mistake doc-
trine.128 Courts also struggle with the language of the release in terms of mis-
take doctrine and traditional written contract treatment.129 
                                                        
124  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208; see also discussion infra Section 
VII.C. 
125  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (“the effect of the mistake is such that 
enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable”). 
126  See, e.g., Schmidt v. Smith, 216 N.W.2d 669, 670–71 (Minn. 1974) (explaining the in-
jured party settled for $2,100 but later sued for $95,000 claiming that she released the re-
leasee when she thought she suffered from muscular strain but later had disc removal and 
spinal fusion surgery as a result of cervical disc syndrome); see also LaFleur v. C.C. Pierce 
Co., 496 N.E.2d 827, 829 (Mass. 1986) (describing that in a matter arising from a workplace 
injury, the injured party signed a release in exchange for $4,000 thinking he had a toe injury; 
he sued to set aside the release after he had both legs amputated above the knee as a conse-
quence of the accident). 
127  See discussion supra Sections IV.A, IV.B; see also infra Sections V.A, V.B. 
128  See, e.g., Ranta v. Rake, 421 P.2d 747, 753 (Idaho 1966) (explaining that the lower court 
dismissed but the appellate court reversed on the basis of the releasor’s intent only). Occa-
sionally, courts do address whether the other party to the release was mistaken. See, e.g., 
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A. Mistake Doctrine Applies with an Unknown Injury But Not with an 
Unknown Consequence of a Known Injury 
Because mistake doctrine requires that the mistake be one of fact existing 
at the time of the signing of the release, some courts state that the mistake doc-
trine can apply to a situation in which the injured party is not aware of the inju-
ry at the time of the release.130 If, however, the injured party is aware of the in-
jury but not its consequences, there is no mistake because the injury existed and 
was known at the time of the release.131 The contract mistake doctrine can ap-
ply to a mistake of diagnosis but not one of prognosis.132 
For example, in Mangini v. McClurg the injured party, resisting enforce-
ment of the release she had executed, claimed that at the time of the signing of 
the release her hip injury was unknown.133 No doctor had identified the hip in-
jury, though she was experiencing pain in the hip.134 Examining physicians be-
lieved the hip pain to be related to a back strain and a hematoma with no lasting 
consequences.135 The New York court stated the test as follows: 
A mistaken belief as to the nonexistence of presently existing injury is a prereq-
uisite to avoidance of a release . . . . If the injury is known, and the mistake, it 
has been said, is merely as to the consequence, future course, or sequelae of a 
known injury, then the release will stand.136 
In effect, with this analysis, if a releasor knows of an injury and releases 
the other party, the releasor has assumed the risk of further consequences of 
that injury. No claim of mistake is therefore possible.137 
                                                                                                                                
Boccarossa v. Watkins, 313 A.2d 135, 137 (R.I. 1973) (finding releasee did not share the 
mistake); Beaver v. Estate of Harris, 409 P.2d 143, 148 (Wash. 1965) (determining releasee 
did not share the mistake). 
129  See discussion supra Section IV.C and infra Sections V.C., V.D. 
130  See, e.g., Mangini v. McClurg, 249 N.E.2d 386, 391 (N.Y. 1969). 
131  Id. 
132  The court in La Fleur v. C.C. Pierce Co., 496 N.E.2d 827 (Mass. 1986), noted: 
[T]he great weight of authority in other jurisdictions supports the view that a release of claims 
for personal injuries may be avoided on the ground of mutual mistake if the parties at the time of 
signing the agreement were mistaken as to the existence of an injury, as opposed to the unknown 
consequences of known injuries. 
Id. at 831. The LaFleur court adopted that approach in finding that there was evidence that 
the injured party had an unknown injury since the earlier diagnosis was a toe injury and the 
later issue was a circulatory problem resulting in leg amputation. Id. at 832; see also Oliver 
v. Clark, 537 N.W.2d 635, 640–41 (Neb. 1995) (“Oliver, to avoid the release in this case, 
must demonstrate that his present condition is not the result of the development of an injury 
known at the execution of the release, but is an injury that was wholly unknown at the re-
lease’s signing.”); Nevue v. Close, 867 P.2d 635, 636–37 (Wash. 1994) (applying this ap-
proach). 
133  Mangini, 249 N.E.2d at 388. 
134  Id. 
135  Id. at 389. 
136  Id. at 391. 
137  See, e.g., Hicks v. Sparks, No. 522, 2013, 2014 WL 1233698, at *3 (Del. Mar. 25, 2014) 
(“Hicks assumed the risk of mistake when she signed the Release without obtaining a more 
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The Mangini court, in reviewing the matter before it, opined that the in-
jured party had put forth sufficient evidence to survive the other party’s motion 
for summary judgment on the issue of mistake.138 Though the injured party was 
aware of pain in her hip area, no hip injury had been contemplated at the time 
of the signing of the release.139 Thus, the hip injury was unknown at the signing 
of the release.140 
As the facts of this case illustrate, this analysis requires courts to delve into 
the high weeds of the injuries. The Mangini court acknowledged the difficulty 
of applying the test stating, “The distinction, a well-established one, is more 
easily expressed than applied in practice, and as a result the cases, it will be 
seen, do not classify perfectly.”141 Indeed, such an analysis seems ill-suited for 
judges who are trained in the art of words, not medicine. It leads to bizarre situ-
ations in which courts must decide issues such as whether a completely severed 
nerve is a new and different injury than a partially severed nerve when the 
nerve being considered is the same,142 or whether an injured party’s knowledge 
of a neck injury means that the herniated disc diagnosis later revealed to the in-
jured party is not a new, previously unknown injury.143 Addressing the difficul-
ty of the test, the Michigan Supreme Court in Denton v. Utley stated: “Yet we 
may well ask, as a practical matter (as distinguished from a verbal technique) is 
it possible to completely divorce diagnosis from prognosis? Is there not an in-
terrelation, even if not an interdependence?”144 
                                                                                                                                
thorough medical examination to fully discover the extent of her injuries related to her neck 
pain.”). 
138  Mangini, 249 N.E.2d at 393. 
139  See id. at 391. 
140  Id. The court then determined that the injured party had also presented evidence to sur-
vive the other party’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether the injured par-
ty had taken the risk of injuries unknown at the time of the signing of the release. See id. at 
393. 
141  Id. at 391. 
142  In Gibli v. Kadosh, 717 N.Y.S.2d 553, 556 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000), the injury was diag-
nosed as an injury to an intact nerve but was eventually discovered to be a permanent injury, 
a completely severed nerve. Reversing a grant of summary judgment for the releasee, the 
court stated that “[t]he nature of the presumed injury is so different from that of the actual 
injury, it is not merely a matter of degree or severity (greater pain or for a longer period). 
Although the parties knew the location of the damage, they misunderstood the nature of the 
damage.” Id. 
143  In Bronson v. Hansel, 913 N.Y.S.2d 851, 852 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010), the injured party 
knew she had a neck injury but did not know that the injury was a herniated disc. The court 
refused to find that the herniated disc was “ ‘as a practical or medical matter, . . . distinguish-
able from unanticipated consequences of [the] known injury.’ ” Id. (quoting Mangini, 249 
N.E.2d at 393). See also Cardovez v. High-Rise Installation, Inc., 46 So. 3d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2010), in which the injured party knew he had a head injury at the time of the 
signing of the release but claimed that he did not know of a later discovered carotid cavern-
ous fistula. The court determined that the fistula was an unknown manifestation of a known 
injury and therefore not a recognizable for relief. Id. at 1123. 
144  Denton v. Utley, 86 N.W.2d 537, 540 (Mich. 1957); see also Tulsa City Lines, Inc. v. 
Mains, 107 F.2d 377, 381 (10th Cir. 1939) (“In cases of this kind it is sometimes difficult, if 
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Note that once a court using this analysis decides that there is or may be a 
recognizable mistake, the court must then face the issue of the value to bestow 
on the release that may allocate the risk of that unknown injury.145 
B. Mistake about the Nature or Extent of the Injury Coupled with an 
Unconscionable Result 
In contrast, Illinois courts recognize a mistake for purposes of the mistake 
doctrine even if the claimed mistake relates to the extent of a known injury.146 
These courts, acknowledging that the approach applies only to releases dealing 
with personal injuries,147 also require the party seeking to have the release set 
aside to prove that the effect of enforcement of the release would be uncon-
scionable given the facts eventually known about the injury.148 
                                                                                                                                
not impossible, to draw a distinct line of separation between mistakes relating to present and 
future facts.”). In Gleason v. Guzman, 623 P.2d 378, 379–80 (Colo. 1981), the court, in rul-
ing that summary judgment was inappropriate where the injured party suffered a head injury 
known at the time of the release but later suffered a seizure disorder, stated: 
Admittedly, line-drawing here is difficult and its direction may well vary with the thrust of evi-
dence. These basic components of knowledge, however, relate primarily to a comprehension of 
the basic character of the injury as distinct from a prediction or opinion about the future course 
of recovery when its basic nature is otherwise known. 
Id. at 385. In Coomer v. Phelps, 172 S.W.3d 389, 391 (Ky. 2005), the court rejected the dis-
tinction between injury and consequence for purposes of mistake doctrine. The court stated 
that the distinction was a “distinction without a difference.” Id. 
145  The injured party must prove a legally cognizable mistake and must also prove that the 
risk of that mistake does not lie with the injured party. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS §§ 152, 154 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also discussion supra Part IV. 
146  See, e.g., Simmons v. Blauw, 635 N.E.2d 601, 604 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“A unilateral or 
self-induced mistake as to the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries is insufficient to 
void a clear and unambiguous release, and the mistake of fact must be mutual, material to the 
transaction, and affect its substance”) (citation omitted); Newborn v. Hood, 408 N.E.2d 474, 
476 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (“Numerous cases have considered the extent and nature of the inju-
ry as eventually manifested in determining conscionability and mutual mistake”) (citation 
omitted). Courts of other jurisdictions may use a similar standard. See, e.g., Taylor v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co., No. 01-A-01-9210-CV00420, 1994 WL 24311, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 
1994) (“Accordingly, both the Supreme Court and this court have declined to enforce gen-
eral releases of insurance claims when the parties have been mutually mistaken concerning 
the nature or seriousness of the claimant’s injuries.”). 
147  See, e.g., Simmons, 635 N.E.2d at 604 (“[C]ases which have determined the validity of 
releases based on a mistake of fact with respect to the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s in-
juries have been treated sui generis, and the rules governing releases from liability for non-
personal injury torts or breaches of contracts do not apply.”). 
148  In Newborn, the court stated: 
The modern trend is to set aside releases of personal injury claims in situations where the facts, 
when finally known, present an unconscionable result because of the equitable principle of doing 
justice under the circumstances of each case. . . . Thus, it is clear that all the facts, including 
those which become known after the release has been executed, must be considered in determin-
ing whether there was a mutual mistake of fact and whether or not the settlement is unconscion-
able. 
Newborn, 408 N.E.2d at 476 (quoting Scherer v. Ravenswood Hosp. Med. Ctr., 388 N.E.2d 
1268, 1271 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979)). 
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In Simmons v. Blauw, the injured party claimed that when she signed the 
release in exchange for compensation of $5,082, she thought that she had suf-
fered a muscular strain in her back as a result of an automobile collision.149 She 
later discovered that she had suffered a herniated disc requiring surgery costing 
$15,000 and was not able to work.150 The injured party, with the benefit of ad-
vice of counsel, had released the releasee from all claims for “all injuries, 
known and unknown, . . . which [had] resulted or may in the future develop 
from [the] accident.”151 The court stated that in determining whether the re-
leasor had a cognizable mistake, the court should consider the following: 
“[W]hether (1) the parties believed the plaintiff had recovered at the time of the 
release, (2) the condition was one which ordinary x-rays and customary exami-
nation did not reveal, and (3) the evidence justified the conclusion that the 
plaintiff acted with reasonable diligence in ascertaining the extent of injury.”152 
The court concluded that the evidence showed only that the releasor, not 
the released party, may have labored under a mistake.153 In addition, the court 
concluded that the effect of enforcing the release was not unconscionable.154 
In contrast, the court reached the opposite result in Newborn v. Hood.155 In 
Newborn, the injured party was treated for injuries resulting from an automo-
bile collision.156 After signing the release with the benefit of advice of counsel, 
in exchange for compensation, the releasor suffered congestive heart failure re-
lated to the accident and incurred expenses exceeding the settlement amount.157 
The court found mutual mistake and, focusing on the monetary effect alone, de-
termined that enforcing the release would have an unconscionable result.158 
C. Special Scrutiny of the Written Release as Part of the Mistake Analysis 
Some courts begin the discussion with the mistake doctrine but detour to an 
analysis of what the injured party intended to release. For example, in Witt v. 
                                                                                                                                
This unconscionability analysis is in contrast to the analysis under unconscionability doc-
trine itself. That doctrine requires that the determination of unconscionability occur at the 
time the contract is formed. See discussion infra Section VII.C. Some courts accept claims of 
mistake relating to the nature or extent of the injury and do not couple the analysis with an 
inquiry into the unconscionability of the result. See, e.g., Taylor, 1994 WL 24311, at *3. 
149  Simmons, 635 N.E.2d at 602. 
150  Id. 
151  Id. at 604. 
152  Id. 
153  Id. (“Aside from conclusory assertions in the affidavit of plaintiff’s attorney, there is no 
evidence that defendant or the representative of his insurer believed that plaintiff would not 
suffer further injuries as a result of the accident.”). 
154  Id. at 605 (“[T]he amount of the settlement was not unconscionable.”). 
155  Newborn v. Hood, 408 N.E.2d 474, 476 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). 
156  Id. at 475. 
157  Id. 
158  Id. at 476 (“[T]here was a mutual mistake . . . . there is a disparity of over $7,000 . . . a 
settlement . . . would be unconscionable.”). 
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Watkins, the Alaska Supreme Court shifted its focus away from determining 
whether there might be a mutual mistake or a disfavored unilateral mistake,159 
and away from any analysis involving a discernment of mistake as to injury as 
opposed to mistake as to unknown effect of known injury.160 The court stated: 
Niceties of distinction between the extent of a known injury or a difference in 
the character of the injury should not be determinative. In either event, the deci-
sion as to whether the release is enforceable should hinge on whether the re-
leasor, at the time of signing the release, intended to discharge the disability 
which was subsequently discovered.161 
The court then directed consideration of factors such as: 
1. “the manner in which the release was obtained—including whether it 
was hastily secured at the instigation of the releasee;” 
2. “whether the releasor was at a disadvantage because of the nature of his 
injuries;” 
3. “whether the releasor was represented by counsel;” 
4. “whether [the releasor] relied on representations of the releasee or a phy-
sician retained by the releasee”; 
5. “whether liability was seriously in dispute”; 
6. “[t]he relative bargaining positions of the parties”; and 
7. “the amount to be paid . . . .”162 
In Witt, the releasor initially was treated for bruised ribs as a result of an 
automobile collision.163 He continued to have pain in his back, which was diag-
nosed as related to a bladder problem probably unrelated to the accident.164 Af-
ter settling the matter for $3,000 with the benefit of counsel, the releasor dis-
covered he had suffered two broken vertebrae, probably as a result of the 
accident.165 In refusing to grant summary judgment for the releasee, the court 
noted that there was no evidence of wrongdoing on the part of the releasee, that 
                                                        
159  Witt v. Watkins, 579 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Alaska 1978) (“[T]he preservation of agreements 
entered into in good faith and the encouragement of settlement of disputes” are interests that 
“may still be preserved without adhering to rigid formulas dependent upon whether mistakes 
are unilateral or mutual.”). 
160  Id. at 1069 (“[W]e deliberately have not preserved the additional artificial distinction be-
tween cases involving a known injury which proves to be much more serious than believed, 
and an injury different in type from that originally known.”). 
161  Id. 
162  Id. at 1070. In Casey v. Proctor, 378 P.2d 579, 588–89 (Cal. 1963) (en banc), the court 
noted the following factors to consider when deciding whether a release was knowingly 
made and bars an action for later discovered personal injuries: (1) “the amount of considera-
tion received compared with the risk of the existence of unknown injuries”; (2) “the presence 
of bargaining and negotiation leading to the settlement”; (3) “the closeness of the issue of 
liability”; (4) “whether the subject of personal injuries was discussed”; and (5) “the reasona-
bleness of the contention that the injuries were in fact unknown at the time the release was 
executed.” 
163  Witt, 579 P.2d at 1066. 
164  Id. at 1067. 
165  Id. 
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the releasor had enjoyed the assistance of counsel, and that the release was not 
the product of haste and was not induced by the releasee or his agents.166 Yet, 
the court concluded that because the releasor had no knowledge at the time of 
entering into the release that he suffered from two broken vertebrae, “A ques-
tion is presented as to whether the fractured vertebrae caused any increased dis-
ability, and particularly, as to whether such disability, if any, was of a type sub-
stantially different from the possibilities of disability considered by Witt at the 
time he signed the release.”167 
This approach deviates significantly from traditional mistake doctrine and 
traditional views of the value of a written agreement.168 The court appears to be 
applying an analysis of the injured party’s subjective intent without giving 
much if any weight to the release itself. The analysis seems unmoored from the 
language of the document entirely. In effect, this approach appears to be a sub-
stantive fairness analysis—at least in part.169 
D. Special Scrutiny of the Written Release When the Releasor Acts with an 
Otherwise Cognizable Mistake 
New York courts look first for a cognizable mistake for purposes of the 
mistake doctrine and do so using the unknown injury/unknown consequence 
distinction.170 Once a court finds a cognizable mistake, the court must then deal 
with the language of the release.171 According to courts in New York, a release 
typically stating that the releasor releases the other party with regard to all inju-
ries, known and unknown172 must be “fairly and knowingly made.”173 As the 
court in Mangini v. McClurg noted, however, if it is apparent from the language 
of the release and the surrounding circumstances that the releasor released the 
                                                        
166  Id. at 1070. 
167  Id. 
168  See discussion supra Section IV.C. 
169  See Gleason v. Guzman, 623 P.2d 378, 387 (Colo. 1981), in which the court found sum-
mary judgment improper for an injured party’s claims though the injured party’s guardian 
had entered into the settlement and signed the release two years after the injury and with the 
assistance of counsel. There had been negotiation and the probate court approved the release. 
Id. at 380; see discussion of traditional doctrine supra Section IV.C. 
170  See discussion supra Section V.A.; see also Mangini v. McClurg, 249 N.E.2d 386, 391 
(N.Y. 1969). 
171  See, e.g., Mangini, 249 N.E.2d at 390 (“[T]he traditional bases for setting aside written 
agreements, namely, duress, illegality, fraud, or mutual mistake, must be established or else 
the release stands.”). 
172  See releases quoted and discussed supra Part I. 
173  See, e.g., Mangini, 249 N.E.2d at 392 (quoting Farrington v. Harlem Sav. Bank, 19 
N.E.2d 657, 657 (N.Y. 1939)); see also Ford v. Phillips, 994 N.Y.S.2d 688, 690 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2014). Washington follows a similar approach. See Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, 97 P.3d 
11, 14 (Wash. 2004) (en banc) (“A release may be avoided if (1) there is an unknown or la-
tent injury discovered after the release was executed and (2) the plaintiff proves the release 
was not fairly and knowingly made.”) (citation omitted); Finch v. Carlton, 524 P.2d 898, 901 
(Wash. 1974) (en banc) (finding the same). 
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other party from all liability even for unknown injuries, so be it.174 Indeed, the 
court noted that a circumstance such as this was very likely: 
It requires particular emphasis that, more often than not, the releasors in person-
al injury cases are willing to settle for relatively small sums or sums that do not 
discount injuries unknown at the time because of the doubtful liability of the re-
leasee, even when ordinary caution would suggest awaiting the development of 
unknown injuries or consequences. When that is the inducement it would be 
false reasoning to assume that the amount of the settlement or the precipitous-
ness of effecting the settlement is corroborative of a mutual mistake.175 
While more bounded than the approach used in the Witt case, this approach 
also is, at least in part, a substantive fairness analysis. Because the approach al-
so focuses on whether the release was knowingly made, there also appears to be 
a focus on whether in fact the release was formed as a result of proper process. 
E. Applying Traditional Doctrine in the Traditional Way 
Some courts have refused to set aside releases on the basis of a claim of 
mistake relating to the injuries suffered.176 In Bernstein v. Kapneck, the Mary-
land court, writing in the early 1980s, reviewed the treatment personal injury 
releases had received across the United States historically and refused to set 
aside the release before it.177 In Bernstein a child suffered injuries as a result of 
an automobile collision.178 Approximately three years after the collision and 
after consulting with counsel, the child’s mother entered into a release in ex-
change for $7,500.179 After the settlement the child began exhibiting a seizure 
                                                        
174  Mangini, 249 N.E.2d at 391 (holding that a release must be enforced if the language of 
the release or circumstances show “a conscious and deliberate intention to discharge liabil-
ity”). 
175  Id. 
176  See, e.g., Coomer v. Phelps, 172 S.W.3d 389, 391–92 (Ky. 2005). The Coomer court re-
affirmed the rule of the jurisdiction set out in Trevathan v. Tesseneer, 519 S.W.2d 614 (Ky. 
1975), that a lack of knowledge or understanding about injuries at the time of the signing of 
a release is not a recognizable mistake for purposes of setting aside the release. The court 
stated: 
To retreat from this rule would cast great doubt on the finality of releases in this state and un-
necessarily complicate settlement considerations. As the Court noted in Trevathan, “[t]his rule 
favors the orderly settlement of disputes and avoids multiplicity of suits and the chaos which 
would result if the releases were not treated seriously by the courts.” We see no need to retreat 
from this rule, thus we expressly reaffirm the holding of Trevathan. 
Coomer, 172 S.W.3d at 391 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Trevathan v. 
Tesseneer, 519 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Ky. 1975)); see also Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 
1452, 1460 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying Guam law); Bernstein v. Kapneck, 430 A.2d 602, 605 
(Md. 1981); Raymond v. Feldmann, 853 P.2d 297, 299 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (en banc); Leyda 
v. Norelli, 564 A.2d 244, 245 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Kendrick v. Barker, 15 P.3d 734, 741 
(Wyo. 2001). 
177  Bernstein, 430 A.2d at 605. 
178  Id. at 603 (describing that the child had a facial laceration, chip fractures of the nasal 
bones, a fracture of a shoulder, and traumatic neurosis). 
179  Id. The release stated in part: 
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disorder related to the collision.180 The mother sought to have the release set 
aside.181 Thus, the court was faced with a very compelling case in terms of 
compassion. 
But the Bernstein court took a different route, noting that many courts have 
been motivated by compassion for the insured to set aside “long established and 
well understood rules of contract law, which . . . normally apply to releases.”182 
The court acknowledged that some courts may be motivated by a desire to pre-
vent an injured party from becoming a public charge.183 The court also noted 
the competing policies of encouraging compromise, of honoring the freedom of 
contract, and of applying traditional contract rules.184 
With regard to findings of mistake by other courts, the Bernstein court not-
ed that the courts reach their results by “an utterly inappropriate application of 
the mutual mistake of fact doctrine to factual circumstances which not only do 
not present a mutual misconception of basic fact, but often do not appear to in-
volve a mistake by even one party.”185 The court did not believe that “violence 
to the human body presents a unique situation” that would validate “the bas-
tardization of the well-founded principles concerning mutual mistake of 
fact.”186 
With regard to interpretation, the court stated: “[W]e are convinced that our 
society will be best served by adherence to the traditional methodology for in-
terpreting contracts in general, including other species of releases.”187 In criti-
cizing the approach taken by other courts, the Bernstein court stated: 
This approach often overlooks or avoids the words used by the parties to express 
their agreement and in its place substitutes undefined conjecture as to what the 
releasor would have intended if the full extent of the injuries had been known at 
the time of the compact. Thus, these courts depart from the otherwise settled 
rules of construction which, for the most part, have operated satisfactorily for 
                                                                                                                                
For the sole consideration of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars . . . Helen M. Bernstein, in-
dividually and as parent and natural guardian of Irene Schulman, a minor, hereby releases and 
forever discharges Barbara Sue Sussman . . . and all other persons, firms or corporations liable 
for or who might claim to be liable, . . . from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, 
causes of action, or suits of whatsoever kind or nature, and particularly on account of loss or 
damage to the property and on account of bodily injuries, known and unknown, and which have 
resulted or may in the future develop, sustained . . . in consequence of an accident involving the 
automobile accident occurring on or about July 25, 1975. 
Id. at 604 (emphasis omitted). 
180  Id. 
181  Id. 
182  Id. at 605 (citation omitted). 
183  Id. at 606. The Bernstein court criticizes other courts for not “openly balancing these pol-
icies” in reaching their conclusion in favor of the injured party. Id. at 607. 
184  Id. at 606. 
185  Id. at 607. 
186  Id. at 607–08. 
187  Id. at 606. 
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centuries, in order to dispose of particularly distressing cases in a compassionate 
and seemingly just manner.188 
Finally, the Bernstein court turned to the release before it, which released 
all claims relating to “bodily injuries, known and unknown.”189 The court con-
cluded that “[i]t would require turning the English language on its head to con-
clude that, from these words used, the releasors did not by this document exhib-
it a clear desire to extinguish the claim for the damages they now seek.”190 
Similarly, in Morta v. Korea Insurance Corporation, the court reached the 
issue of the value to be given to the writing.191 In Morta, a party injured in an 
automobile collision, after consulting with counsel, signed a release in ex-
change for compensation.192 Later, the injured party claimed that the release 
was the product of fraud, undue influence, or mistake in that he did not read the 
release and did not understand that it applied to injuries of which he was not 
aware.193 The federal court, applying Guam law, found no evidence of fraud or 
undue influence.194 In addition, the court found no mistake because the injured 
party had the opportunity to read the release and have it explained to him by his 
counsel.195 
Addressing the claim that the release should not be read to apply to un-
known injuries, the Morta court noted that the release was unambiguous and, 
by its terms, the injured party released the other party from all claims “growing 
out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and 
personal injuries and property damage” arising from the incident relating to the 
injuries.196 The injured party argued that the release should not be held to re-
lease unknown claims unless evidence extrinsic to the writing supported that 
interpretation.197 The court refused to adopt such an approach, choosing to rely 
on the writing, the release, and not on evidence extrinsic to that writing,198 not-
ing that “it is exceedingly difficulty [sic] to know what parties really thought 
                                                        
188  Id. at 607. 
189  Id. at 604; see supra note 179 for the release language. 
190  Bernstein, 430 A.2d at 609. 
191  Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452, 1455 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying Guam law). 
192  Id. at 1454–55. 
193  Id. at 1455, 1457–58. The injured party claimed that he was not aware of a blood clot in 
his brain that necessitated surgery. Id. at 1455, 1458. 
194  Id. at 1456–57. 
195  Id. at 1458. 
196  Id. at 1458 n.7. 
197  Id. at 1459. 
198  Id. The Morta court stated: 
Written instruments, fixing the parties’ rights and responsibilities by mutual consent, bring an 
important measure of order to life and greatly facilitate the adjudicatory process. While inter-
preting contract language is not always easy, sticking to the words the parties actually used lim-
its substantially the bounds of legitimate disagreement. This objective rule thus “favors the or-
derly settlement of disputes and avoids multiplicity of suits and the chaos which would result if 
the releases were not treated seriously by the courts.” 
Id. (quoting Trevathan v. Tesseneer, 519 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Ky. 1975)). 
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many years back and virtually impossible to divine what they would have 
thought had they but known something they did not.”199 
VI. THE POLICIES AT PLAY 
Why is it that some courts treat claims of mistake regarding personal injury 
releases differently? What is the basis for reforming the mistake doctrine so 
that a claim of mistake in a personal injury release setting is cognizable, or for 
short-circuiting established agreement interpretation canons? Several policies 
are at play. On the one hand are the policies in favor of enforcing contracts 
freely entered into and the policy in favor of encouraging settlement. On the 
other side of the ledger, courts have spoken of the unknowability of the human 
body and thus its injuries, a desire that injured parties be compensated by the 
wrongdoer and not become a public burden, the noncommercial context, and a 
need to protect injured parties because of their weakness or lesser bargaining 
position. 
A. Freedom of Contract Should Be Honored 
Courts enforce contracts unless there is a very good reason not to do so.200 
There is a long-recognized understanding that keeping and enforcing promises 
has a moral dimension as well as a utilitarian one.201 Our system of economic 
ordering depends on individual actors being able to enter into agreements with 
regard to the future and have some degree of confidence that those agreements 
will be enforced.202 The parties’ expectations are honored and the transactional 
world enjoys stability. Enforcing contracts and therefore honoring freedom of 
contract also touches upon respect for the autonomy of each individual actor in 
that individuals contract as they see fit and the courts honor each individual’s 
choice. Thus, each actor has the right and power to contract as he or she choos-
es and courts honor that choice without second-guessing. This exercise of indi-
vidual choice in contracting and the respect given that choice by courts’ en-
forcement of contracts is a facet of liberty.203 As the United States Supreme 
                                                        
199  Id. at 1460; see also Raymond v. Feldmann, 853 P.2d 297, 299 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (en 
banc) (noting mutual mistake is not a basis for setting aside a personal injury release). 
200  See Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 422 (N.Y. 1887) (“[P]ublic policy and 
the interests of society favor the utmost freedom of contract, within the law . . .”). 
201  See MURRAY, supra note 2, § 1, at 2 (“Historically and philosophically, the most funda-
mental concept of contract is that promises ought to be kept.”). 
202  See EV3, Inc. v. Lesh, 114 A.3d 527, 529 n.3 (Del. 2014) (“Delaware courts seek to en-
sure freedom of contract and promote clarity in the law in order to facilitate commerce.”) 
(citation omitted); see also MURRAY, supra note 2, § 6, at 15 (“By facilitating future ex-
changes, the institution of contract brings persons and resources together as a necessary con-
dition to the operation of the market system.”). 
203  See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 2 
(2d ed. 2015) (“The regime of contract law, which respects the dispositions individuals make 
of their rights, carries to its natural conclusion the liberal premise that individuals have 
rights.”); see also Hodge v. Evans Fin. Corp., 707 F.2d 1566, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“A 
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Court has stated, “[T]he right of private contract is no small part of the liberty 
of the citizen, and . . . the usual and most important function of courts of justice 
is . . . to maintain and enforce contracts . . . .”204 
Even so, the courts have developed several narrow doctrines over the years 
for identifying situations in which the contract or its formation is flawed. In the 
rare situation in which the facts fit one of these doctrines, a court might rescind 
the contract to obtain a superior justice than would result from enforcing the 
contract. Today’s courts rarely set aside contracts or refuse to enforce contracts, 
but if they do, they do so because those contracts are the product of fraud, du-
ress, mistake, or another recognized contract avoidance doctrine.205 
Courts long have been wary of engaging in a review of the substantive 
fairness of an agreement and do so only when such a review is a part of a rec-
ognized doctrine such as unconscionability.206 For example, in Apfel v. Pruden-
tial-Bache Securities, Inc., the court stated: 
Under the traditional principles of contract law, the parties to a contract are free 
to make their bargain, even if the consideration exchanged is grossly unequal or 
of dubious value. Absent fraud or unconscionability, the adequacy of considera-
tion is not a proper subject for judicial scrutiny. It is enough that something of 
“real value in the eye of the law” was exchanged.207 
Thus, this freedom of contract carries with it a downside—the freedom to 
make an improvident deal. To honor the freedom of contract is to enforce the 
bad deal absent a recognized flaw addressed by a recognized contract avoid-
                                                                                                                                
basic principle of contract law is the concept of freedom of contract—the right of the con-
tracting parties to structure their transactions in accordance with their wishes.”). In fact, the 
United States Constitution protects the freedom of contract. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 
1. 
204  Balt. & Ohio Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900) (discussing setting aside a 
contract on the basis of public policy). See generally Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of 
Contract, and the “Rise and Fall”, 79 B.U. L. REV. 263 (1999) (discussing the relationship 
of freedom to freedom of contract). 
205  See 7 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: AVOIDANCE AND REFORMATION 
§§ 28–29 (rev. ed. 2002 Supp. 2016) (discussing the doctrines generally). 
206  The unconscionability doctrine does call for a substantive fairness review but usually 
only when linked with a procedural fairness analysis and in any case the review is done as of 
the time the contract was formed, not in hindsight. See discussion infra Section VII.C. A 
fairness analysis might also be a part of the unilateral mistake doctrine, at least as the doc-
trine is delineated by the Restatement, but there the analysis is also linked to a finding of 
blameworthiness on the part of the other party to the contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 153 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also supra Section IV.D. 
207  Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1095, 1097 (N.Y. 1993) (citations omit-
ted); see also Thomsen v. Famous Dave’s of Am., Inc., 606 F.3d 905, 911 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(“Whether Thomsen made a wise bargain is irrelevant, as unambiguous contract language 
‘shall be enforced by courts even if the result is harsh.’ ”) (quoting Denelsbeck v. Wells Far-
go & Co., 666 N.W.2d 339, 347 (Minn. 2003)); Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for Con-
sideration, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 953 (1958) (reasoning courts should not delve into fair-
ness analysis). See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 29, § 4.1, at 218 (“[C]ourts have been 
most reluctant to view the problem in the first perspective, that of substantive unfairness.”). 
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ance doctrine. As one court has stated, “the general rule of freedom of contract 
includes the freedom to make a bad bargain.”208 
B. Settlement of Disputes Outside of Courts Should Be Encouraged 
Because releases settle disputes, the universally-recognized policy in favor 
of settlement is relevant. The starting point is the idea that settlement of contro-
versies outside of courts is a positive result which courts should encourage.209 
Courts recognized this policy long ago and continue to do so even in this time 
of plentiful settlements.210 The policy is present in court decisions and also is 
manifested in the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, which makes settlement a 
proper topic for the pretrial conference.211 Settlements have value only if they 
are respected, so it is the finality of settlement agreements—and releases that 
are part of settlement agreements—which furthers the policy of encouraging 
settlement.212 
The motivating rationale for this pro-settlement policy is a blend of ideas. 
First, is the idea that when matters are decided by settlement, there is less bur-
den on the judicial system.213 Some courts also note that settlement is easier on 
the parties because it reduces the financial214 and emotional strain215 that litiga-
                                                        
208  Sanger v. Yellow Cab Co., 486 S.W.2d 477, 482 (Mo. 1972) (en banc); see also United 
Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 806 F.2d 1385, 1386 (9th Cir. 
1986) (“Wise or not, a deal is a deal.”). 
209  See generally Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary 
System, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 (1992); J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive 
Theory of Civil Settlement, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 59, 60–61 (2016). 
210  See Peak v. Adams, 799 N.W.2d 535, 543 (Iowa 2011) (citing the long-held view that 
settlements should be encouraged); see also St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Mont. Min-
ing Co., 171 U.S. 650, 656 (1898) (“[S]ettlements of matters in litigation, or in dispute, 
without recourse to litigation, are generally favored . . .”). With regard to the commonness of 
settlements, see Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and 
Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 146 (2009) (stating that about two-
thirds of civil cases settle). 
211  See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5), (c)(2)(I); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s 
note to 1983 Amendment (The amendments “explicitly recognize[] that it has become com-
monplace to discuss settlement at pretrial conferences” and “it obviously eases crowded 
court dockets and results in savings to the litigants and the judicial system”). 
212  See Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc., 739 P.2d 648, 653 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) (discuss-
ing the policy in favor of finality of settlement agreements). 
213  See, e.g., Murchison v. Grand Cypress Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 1483, 1486 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(encouraging settlements to “conserve judicial resources”); see also Richard D. Freer, Exo-
dus from and Transformation of American Civil Litigation, 65 EMORY L.J. 1491, 1498 
(2016) (discussing the burden on the courts). 
214  See, e.g., Vill. of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating that set-
tlement allows the parties to avoid the expense and delay that accompanies litigation); see 
also David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 91–92 
(1983) (discussing the financial burden). 
215  See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 
2621 (1995) (“Lawsuits are expensive, terrifying, frustrating, infuriating, humiliating, time-
consuming, perhaps all-consuming.”). 
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tion and the associated risks can cause. Settlement is also a way that parties can 
have more control over the result than is possible in litigation.216 
C. Bodily Injuries Are Not Commercial and Are Too Mysterious for the 
Common Person to Understand; Injured Parties Are in Need of Protection 
Because of Weakness or Bargaining Disparity; Injured Parties Must Be 
Compensated 
Several motivations may be at work when a court chooses to give special 
treatment to personal injury releasors who seek to avoid their releases. Those 
attempting to understand motivations note that the situation is not truly com-
mercial and so some of the underpinnings of contract enforcement do not ap-
ply.217 Some courts inclined to apply particularly favorable analysis to injured 
parties seeking to avoid releases have focused on the fact that a personal injury 
release deals with the person and the body, and that there is something un-
knowable about the workings of the human body.218 Another motivation seems 
to be a belief that the injured party needs protection, either because such a per-
son is somehow weak or simply as a result of bargaining disparity.219 Some 
courts seem concerned that the blameworthy party will enjoy a windfall at the 
expense of the injured party or the public coffers.220 Of course, another implicit 
if not explicit motivation is a desire to impose what, in retrospect, appears to 
the court to be a substantively fair result.221 
                                                        
216  See, e.g., Natare Corp. v. Aquatic Renovation Sys., Inc., 987 F. Supp. 695, 700 (S.D. Ind. 
1997) (“Settlements . . . allow the parties to fashion the outcome of their disputes through 
mutual agreement.”). 
217  See PERILLO, supra note 205, § 28.34, at 174 (“Social policies favoring the assumption of 
entrepreneurial risks as a means of improving market efficiency are not present.”); see also 
Ricketts v. Pa. R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 767 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring) (explaining 
that the consistency needed in commercial setting is not needed here). 
218  See, e.g., Clancy v. Pacenti, 145 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ill. App. Ct. 1957) (“[T]he most com-
plicated and mysterious of all the things that are upon or inhabit the earth.”). 
219  See, e.g., Ranta v. Rake, 421 P.2d 747, 751 (Idaho 1966) (addressing the inequality of 
bargaining positions); Clancy, 145 N.E.2d at 805 (addressing bargaining inequality). 
220  See, e.g., Casey v. Proctor, 378 P.2d 579, 587 (Cal. 1963) (en banc) (“[I]f the releaser is 
bound by the literal terms of the release, it has been recognized that he is left to suffer per-
sonal injuries without compensation, while the releasee, who usually is an insurer, has re-
ceived a windfall . . . .”); Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc., 739 P.2d 648, 653 (Wash. 1987) 
(en banc) (discussing the policy of just compensation of injured parties by tortfeasors); see 
also Dobbs, supra note 32, at 667 (“But an equally individualistic principle says that the 
wrongdoer—not society, or the victim, or the victim’s family, but the wrongdoer—should 
pay.”). Of course, taken to its extreme, this argument could justify a position that allows no 
settlements at all. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 26–27 (2d ed. 
2011) (“Compensation of persons injured by wrongdoing is one of the generally accepted 
aims of tort law . . . [U]ncompensated injured persons will represent further costs and prob-
lems for society.”). 
221  In Ranta v. Rake, the Idaho Supreme Court, writing in 1966 and looking back at earlier 
cases, noted that one concern was “the amount of consideration received compared to the 
risk of the existence of unknown injuries.” Ranta, 421 P.2d at 751. See Wheeler v. White 
Rock Bottling Co. of Or., 366 P.2d 527, 530 (Or. 1961) (“Such cases simply hold that it is 
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The court in Clancy v. Pacenti, attempted to explain the motivating ration-
ales relating to human biology being unknowable and not a commercial matter 
as follows: 
In such cases it is not an article of commerce that is involved, but the human 
mind and body, still the most complicated and mysterious of all the things that 
are upon or inhabit the earth. Here, mistakes are easily made and the conse-
quences are more serious than in any other of the affairs of man. A slight abra-
sion may mean nothing or it may lead to a malignancy. Insignificant pain may 
mean the beginning of a fatal coronary attack or only a slight intestinal disturb-
ance. Yet, a man cannot and does not live in dread of these possibilities. He ac-
cepts assurances that all will be well, even though ultimate consequences cannot 
be appraised as in matters involving property or services.222 
The Clancy court also addressed the bargaining ability and power ration-
ales, likening the situation of personal injury releases in general to the treat-
ment historically given to releases signed by seamen when dealing with their 
employers.223 In this regard, the Clancy court stated: 
The sharp economic inequality of the bargaining parties which generally exists 
in this class of cases has also been considered by the courts in their considera-
tion of this doctrine. It is by no means as modern an innovation as to some may 
appear. Long before personal injury cases began to absorb the common law 
courts, the rule was applied to seamen in admiralty cases. That related to con-
tracts between seamen and their employers, but no one can doubt that it has a 
considerable bearing upon situations such as are here presented.224 
Other earlier cases, like Clancy, rely in part on the historical treatment 
courts have given releases for seamen’s injuries.225 Traditionally, courts have 
viewed seamen as “wards of admiralty,” and have reviewed releases entered 
into by seamen with great scrutiny.226 In 1823 in Harden v. Gordon, the court 
stated the standards for the analysis as follows: 
[Seamen] are emphatically the wards of the admiralty; and though not technical-
ly incapable of entering into a valid contract, they are treated in the same man-
ner, as courts of equity are accustomed to treat young heirs, dealing with their 
expectancies, wards with their guardians, and cestuis que trust with their trus-
tees. . . . If there is any undue inequality in the terms, any disproportion in the 
                                                                                                                                
not fair to an injured tort victim to hold him to a bargain if it turns out later that the bargain 
was grossly unwise.”). 
222  Clancy v. Pacenti, 145 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ill. App. Ct. 1957). 
223  Id. 
224  Id. (citation omitted). 
225  See, e.g., Ricketts v. Pa. R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 764–65 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., con-
curring). 
226  Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 247–48 (1942). See Karim v. Finch 
Shipping Co., 374 F.3d 302, 310 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Seamen, of course, are wards of admiralty 
whose rights federal courts are duty-bound to jealously protect.”) (quoting Bass v. Phx. 
Seadrill/78, Ltd., 749 F.2d 1154, 1160 (5th Cir. 1985)). For a discussion of the origin of the 
treatment of seamen, see Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 121 F.2d 336, 345 (2d 
Cir. 1941) (concluding that at least some of the reason for the special treatment was com-
merce and national security which benefit when employees are induced to serve at sea). 
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bargain, any sacrifice of rights on one side, which are not compensated by ex-
traordinary benefits on the other, the judicial interpretation of the transaction, is 
that the bargain is unjust and unreasonable, that advantage has been taken of the 
situation of the weaker party, and that pro tanto the bargain ought to be set aside 
as inequitable.227 
In Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., the United States Supreme Court, in 
reviewing a Jones Act case involving a seaman’s personal injury release, stated 
that the employer-releasee dealing with the seaman “must affirmatively show 
that no advantage has been taken; and his burden is particularly heavy where 
there has been inadequacy of consideration.”228 
 Some of the statements of rationale behind this special treatment seem 
loaded with assumptions and prejudices.229 For example, an early statement of 
supporting rationale refers to seamen as “a class of persons remarkable for their 
rashness, thoughtlessness and improvidence.”230 
Some modern courts focus more on the issue of whether the seaman en-
tered into the release knowingly and less on the substantive fairness of the deal. 
For example, in Durley v. Offshore Drilling Company, the court stated that the 
test is “whether, at the time of relinquishing his rights, the seaman had ‘an in-
                                                        
227  Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 485 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6047). 
228  Garrett, 317 U.S. at 247. The Garrett court noted that this protection is not unusual in 
that Congress had taken other steps to protect seaman’s rights. See id. at 246; see also 
Rabenstein v. Sealift, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 343, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[T]he burden is upon 
one who sets up a seaman’s release to show that it was executed freely, without deception or 
coercion, and that it was made by the seaman with full understanding of his rights.”) (quot-
ing Garrett, 317 U.S. at 248). 
229  See Havighurst, supra note 32, at 307 (“This rule had its origin in early times and is 
based upon the recognition that most seafaring men are as individuals relatively incapable of 
adequately protecting their own interests.”). 
230  Brown v. Lull, 4 F. Cas. 407, 409 (C.C.D. Mass. 1836) (No. 2018); see also The S.S. 
Standard. Bonici v. Standard Oil Co., 103 F.2d 437, 438 (2d Cir. 1939) (quoting Brown, 4 F. 
Cas. at 409). In Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., the court quoted a passage from an 
earlier opinion that sheds great insight on this peculiar view of seamen: 
On the one side are gentlemen possessed of wealth, and intent, I mean not unfairly, upon aug-
menting it, conversant in business, and possessing the means of calling in the aid of practical and 
professional knowledge. On the other side is a set of men, generally ignorant and illiterate, noto-
riously and proverbially reckless and improvident, ill provided with the means of obtaining use-
ful information, and almost ready to sign any instrument that may be proposed to them; and on 
all accounts requiring protection, even against themselves. 
Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 121 F.2d at 341 (quoting The Minerva, 1 Hagg. 
Adm., 347, 355 (1825)). The Hume court also stated: 
Every court should watch with jealousy an encroachment upon the rights of seamen, because 
they are unprotected and need counsel; because they are thoughtless and require indulgence; be-
cause they are credulous and complying; and are easily overreached. . . . They are considered as 
placed under the dominion and influence of men, who have naturally acquired a mastery over 
them; and as they have little of the foresight and caution belonging to persons trained in other 
pursuits of life, the most rigid scrutiny is instituted into the terms of every contract, in which 
they engage. 
Id. at 341 n.13 (quoting Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 485 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 
6047)). 
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formed understanding of his rights and a full appreciation of the consequenc-
es.’ ”231 The court noted that courts have been concerned with the adequacy of 
the settlement consideration only in regard to what that tells courts about the 
seaman’s understanding of the deal, not as a review of the substantive fairness 
of the deal.232 
Perhaps these courts are acknowledging that earlier courts’ opinions of the 
contractual capabilities of seamen is no longer true if it ever was. Perhaps sea-
men of the twenty-first century do not require such paternalism as was present-
ed in cases from an earlier time. Perhaps seamen should be treated like any oth-
er party who releases federal rights.233 In any event the broad class of parties 
who sign personal injury releases cannot be described as being incapable of 
evaluating their situations and weighing their choices and entering into valid 
releases in exchange for compensation. 
Beyond the suggestions touching upon the injured party’s ability, courts 
have also justified lenient treatment of personal injury releasors by noting that 
releasors are often in a position of unequal bargaining strength.234 Interestingly, 
several courts dealing with the issue of enforcement of personal injury releases 
refer approvingly for rationale to a concurring opinion in Ricketts v. Pennsylva-
nia Railroad Company, a case decided under the Federal Employers’ Liability 
Act (FELA).235 Judge Learned Hand wrote the majority opinion for the 
court,236 but some later courts dealing with personal injury releases have 
looked, not to the majority opinion, but to Judge Frank’s concurrence as a 
touchstone.237 This is true even though the Ricketts case involved a release of 
rights under FELA, federal law, not a release of state law rights, and even 
though the release was in the employee and employer context rather than the 
                                                        
231  Durley v. Offshore Drilling Co., 288 Fed. App’x 188, 190 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Borne 
v. A & P Boat Rentals No. 4, Inc., 780 F.2d 1254, 1256 (5th Cir. 1986)). See Rabenstein, 18 
F. Supp. 3d at 355 (explaining releasee has the burden of proving that the seaman entered 
into the release freely, knowing and understanding his rights but if that is proven, the seaman 
will be bound). 
232  Durley, 288 Fed. App’x at 190. See Steverson v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., 508 F.3d 300, 
304 (5th Cir. 2007) (explaining the same). 
233  Claims related to injuries to seamen are generally federal claims, often under the Jones 
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012). See, e.g., GlobalSantaFe Corp., 508 F.3d at 302. See infra 
Part VIII for a discussion of a modern federal approach. 
234  See, e.g., Clancy v. Pacenti, 145 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ill. App. Ct. 1957); see also Hav-
ighurst, supra note 32, at 308 (noting releasee has “experience, knowledge and economic 
power” so “many settlements are undoubtedly unfair”). 
235  Ricketts v. Pa. R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 758 (2d Cir. 1946). See Federal Employers’ Lia-
bility Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2012). 
236  The majority opinion in Ricketts stated that the jury in the lower court could have found 
that the injured employee of the railroad authorized his attorney to settle only part of the 
claim and not to settle the entire matter. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 760. Thus, the release that the 
employee signed at the direction of the attorney and that he could not read due to his injuries, 
was not a bar to the employee recovering against his employer, the railroad. Id. 
237  See, e.g., Witt v. Watkins, 579 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Alaska 1978); Gleason v. Guzman, 623 
P.2d 378, 384 (Colo. 1981); Ranta v. Rake, 421 P.2d 747, 752 (Idaho 1966). 
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context of automobile collisions as is true with many personal injury releas-
es.238 In Judge Frank’s view, injured employees—when dealing with employers 
regarding releases—were in the same position as seamen since they were “no 
less helpless in their trafficking with their employers.”239 Judge Frank conclud-
ed that the employee of the railroad who arguably entered into a release of the 
railroad for his personal injuries, should be treated “as . . . if he were a sea-
man.”240 
Even if one accepts that seamen should receive protective treatment regard-
ing personal injury releases in terms of heightened scrutiny of the release pro-
cess or even the substantive fairness of the release as a result of weakness of 
bargaining position or ability of seamen, it is quite an analytical journey to 
reach Judge Frank’s position that employees under FELA are also weak in 
terms of bargaining position or ability such that they should be treated like 
seamen. It is then a further journey to the position that all personal injury re-
leasors should enjoy special, favorable treatment as the result of weakness of 
bargaining position or ability. 
VII.  PERSONAL INJURY RELEASES SHOULD NOT RECEIVE SPECIAL TREATMENT 
A. The Policies Do Not Require It 
Traditional contract law provides that in order to protect the sanctity of 
contracts, contracts should be set aside only when a traditional doctrine de-
mands that.241 The avoidance doctrines of mistake, duress, unconscionability, 
and such are situations in which the law recognizes that the contract or the pro-
cess used to form it was flawed. When the question is the enforceability of per-
sonal injury releases, the releases should not be set aside unless those tradition-
al doctrines, applied as they would be in other settings, dictate that result. The 
fact that the contracts at issue are, in effect, settlement contracts makes the situ-
ation one in which courts should especially take care to set aside only those 
contracts that are truly problematic under traditional doctrine analysis. 
No policy put forward in support of providing more favorable treatment to 
personal injury releasors demands that preferential treatment. Personal injury 
releases deal with the body and are therefore not commerce in the same sense 
                                                        
238  See, e.g., Maglin v. Tschannerl, 800 A.2d 486, 487 (Vt. 2002) (regarding automobile col-
lision). But see Gleason, 623 P.2d at 380 (regarding accident in employment context). 
239  Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 767 (Frank, J., concurring). Judge Frank stated that the United 
States Supreme Court in Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942), had 
“broadly hinted that the courts should treat non-maritime employees, with respect to releases 
of personal injury claims, just as they treat seamen.” Id. at 760 (Frank, J., concurring). Judge 
Frank pointed to footnote seventeen of the Garrett case for this broad hint. Id. However, 
footnote seventeen simply noted several maritime cases as well as non-maritime cases that 
the Court referred to as “somewhat comparable.” Garrett, 317 U.S. at 248 n.17. 
240  Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 769 (Frank, J., concurring). 
241  See discussion supra Section VI.A. 
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that agreements relating to widgets are commerce—but releases are a sort of 
commerce nonetheless. The parties to the release are attempting to create cer-
tainty in a matter about which there is uncertainty. The releasor seeks compen-
sation sooner rather than later and seeks the certainty of payment that may not 
occur at all if the parties do not agree to settle the matter. The releasor seeks to 
eliminate further worry and expense that would occur without the settlement. 
The other party likewise seeks to settle the matter without further time and 
money commitments. This party, too, seeks to end the matter and thus gain cer-
tainty with regard to the ultimate cost of the matter. There is always uncertainty 
about the injuries and their eventual path, just as there are uncertainties about 
whether a widget maker will be able to provide the widgets as agreed. 
Nor is this unknowability regarding bodily injuries such that an injured 
party must be protected more than traditional contract doctrine otherwise pro-
vides. As the Oregon Supreme Court stated in Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling 
Company of Oregon: 
When courts recite, for example, as a matter of more or less common 
knowledge, that terminal tumors sometimes begin with minor contusions, or 
otherwise concern themselves with details of tragedy that may stalk those who 
sign early releases, they are not announcing truths known only to lawyers. These 
matters are also commonly known by laymen.242 
Perhaps members of society were less aware of the nature of human biolo-
gy at some point in the past, but today the Wheeler court is correct. Members of 
society who are injured in automobile collisions and other accidents of life un-
derstand the possibilities of their injuries. 
Similarly, the notion that the releasor in a personal injury release situation 
is somehow incapable of understanding the transaction he or she enters into 
when signing a release is, simply, preposterous. People who find themselves in 
automobile crashes are, one would imagine, a fair sampling of society as a 
whole: everyone gets into car accidents. Releasors are neither weaker of mind 
nor stronger of mind than the populace as a whole. It is not a complex notion 
that injuries from an automobile collision or other such event may not have 
manifested at the time of the signing of the release. The language of the releas-
es, though perhaps awkward, is not difficult to understand. And a party who 
reads a document that says that in exchange for a certain sum of money that 
party is agreeing to forego all claims regarding known and unknown injuries or 
effects, can easily understand what that means. Unlike a loan document with 
complex payment and liability language,243 a personal injury release actually 
deals with a subject matter every person understands, his or her own body. The 
release is also a part of a fairly simple transaction, an exchange of compensa-
                                                        
242  Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling Co. of Or., 366 P.2d 527, 530 (Or. 1961). 
243  See, e.g., Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown, 737 S.E.2d 640, 654 (W. Va. 2012) (discussing 
a confusing loan transaction). 
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tion in exchange for a promise to look no more to the releasee. The release is 
typically not complex and comprises one or two pages.244 
Further, because a personal injury release follows a calamitous event, par-
ties of today are very often represented at the time they sign the release.245 
These attorneys should be assisting the injured parties, their clients, in under-
standing the realm of possible outcomes regarding their injuries as well as as-
sisting the injured parties in understanding exactly what the release means in 
terms of risk assumption. 
In addition, an injured party is not necessarily in a bargaining position that 
would demand special treatment by the courts. The injured party may be the 
less sophisticated party to the settlement if the other side of the deal is, as is of-
ten the case, being handled by an insurer, but, again, the injured party often has 
the benefit of counsel. While the language of the release is often that of the re-
leasee, the injured party can and often does negotiate with regard to the amount 
of compensation.246 Ultimately, the injured party can refuse to settle the matter 
and opt to pursue litigation. 
Finally, general tort policy that wrongdoers should compensate injured par-
ties so those parties do not become a burden on society is too general a policy 
to justify special treatment for personal injury releases. With a personal injury 
release in exchange for compensation, the wrongdoer is compensating the in-
jured party the amount the injured party agrees is sufficient. Is the law to say 
that the injured party cannot be the judge of that amount and that the courts 
should always be the ultimate decider? While the issue of the burden on society 
is not present in the commercial dispute setting, even there the policy of requir-
ing the wrongdoer to compensate the harmed party is present. Should settle-
ment agreements not be allowed? Tort policy should not trump contract policy 
in this way. 
B. The Current Situation is Problematic for Traditional Doctrines 
As the Maryland court in Bernstein v. Kapneck court stated, “violence to 
the human body” does not justify “the bastardization of the well-founded prin-
ciples concerning mutual mistake of fact” or any other contract doctrine.247 Not 
only is the policy justification for special treatment for personal injury releasors 
lacking, but also the courts, in applying the traditional mistake doctrine differ-
ently and in refusing to give traditional treatment to the releases signed by per-
sonal injury releasors, may be doing subtle harm to traditional contract doc-
                                                        
244  See discussion supra Part I. 
245  See, e.g., Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452, 1458 (9th Cir. 1988). 
246  See, e.g., Hicks v. Sparks, No. 522, 2013, 2014 WL 1233698, at *1 (Del. Mar. 25, 2014) 
(explaining the releasee initially offered Hicks $2000; Hicks countered with $7000; the re-
leasee then offered $2500; Hicks countered with $5000; the releasee then offered $3000; 
Hicks reiterated a demand of $5000; the releasee then offered $4000; Hicks accepted). 
247  Bernstein v. Kapneck, 430 A.2d 602, 607–08 (Md. 1981). 
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trine. While mistake doctrine has never been the model of clarity, the treatment 
courts have given personal injury releases under the guise of mistake doctrine 
has done nothing to clarify the proper bounds of the doctrine. Indeed, while 
such an effect cannot be measured, the bastardization of the doctrine may cause 
damage to its rational application in other settings. In effect, to misuse it in the 
personal injury release setting is to do damage to the doctrine for all purposes. 
The same may be true for the value given the written document for purposes of 
adding to it or interpreting its words. 
In many cases, courts may be simply reviewing the releases on a substan-
tive fairness basis explicitly or surreptitiously.248 In contrast, courts generally 
have not reviewed contracts for fairness.249 Courts have long noted that they 
would not review adequacy of consideration—a fairness analysis; that was the 
job of the parties to the contract.250 It is true that unconscionability doctrine al-
lows for a substantive fairness analysis, but most courts link that analysis with a 
procedural analysis as well.251 
The superior approach is to treat personal injury releases as other contracts 
are treated. Courts should not bend or reform current traditional contract doc-
trine to reach a result desired. 
C. The Unconscionability Doctrine May Be Useful 
Though mistake doctrine is not a useful doctrine when properly applied to 
the situation of personal injury releases, unconscionability doctrine might be 
useful just as duress and fraud could be useful with the right facts. Historically, 
releasors seeking to have personal injury releases set aside have not turned to 
the contract unconscionability doctrine as a means of achieving that end.252 
                                                        
248  See Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling Co. of Or., 366 P.2d 527, 530 (Or. 1961) (“Such 
cases simply hold that it is not fair to an injured tort victim to hold him to a bargain if it turns 
out later that the bargain was grossly unwise.”). 
249  See Ryan v. Weiner, 610 A.2d 1377, 1381 (Del. Ch. 1992), in which the court stated: 
“The notion that a court can and will review contracts for fairness is apt for good reason to 
strike us as dangerous, subjecting negotiated bargains to the loosely constrained review of 
the judicial process.” 
250  See, e.g., Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1095, 1097 (N.Y. 1993). The 
Apfel court stated: “Under the traditional principles of contract law, the parties to a contract 
are free to make their bargain, even if the consideration exchanged is grossly unequal or of 
dubious value. Absent fraud or unconscionability, the adequacy of consideration is not a 
proper subject for judicial scrutiny.” Id. (citation omitted). 
251  See, e.g., Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. v. Boyd, 403 P.3d 1014, 1022–23 (Wyo. 
2017) (requiring both substantive and procedural unfairness); see also discussion infra Sec-
tion VII.C. 
252  While some courts have examined whether a release has unconscionable effect as part of 
a mistake doctrine analysis, such an examination of unconscionable effect considers the situ-
ation in hindsight. See, e.g., Simmons v. Blauw, 635 N.E.2d 601, 604 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) 
(applying an unconscionable effect analysis); Kelly v. Widner, 771 P.2d 142, 144–46 (Mont. 
1989) (citing to Uniform Commercial Code unconscionability doctrine provision but consid-
ering post-contract evidence). 
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Though the concept of unconscionability has existed in the common law for a 
very long time,253 its clear recognition as a doctrine coalesced in the middle of 
the twentieth century with states’ adoption of the Uniform Commercial 
Code.254 Section 2-302 of the Code provides that a court may refuse to enforce 
a contract or a part of a contract on the basis of unconscionability. Section 2-
302 states, in part: 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to 
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to en-
force the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable 
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.255 
Following this example, the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts added a new unconscionability provision, Section 208, which states: 
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a 
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the 
contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any 
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.256 
Courts have struggled to develop a principled approach to the unconscion-
ability doctrine. Many courts follow a two-pronged analysis that focuses on 
procedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability.257 An agree-
ment or provision is procedurally unconscionable if it is the result of defective 
bargaining process.258 Substantive unconscionability is present when the 
agreement’s terms are unreasonably favorable to one of the parties to the 
deal.259 As one court has stated, “[s]ubstantive unconscionability occurs when 
                                                        
253  See McCullough, supra note 36, at 787 (discussing the history of the doctrine and noting 
that the concept dates back to at least the seventeenth century; early cases were treated as 
public policy cases). 
254  A draft of the Uniform Commercial Code was completed in 1951. Pennsylvania adopted 
it in 1953. After the New York Law Revision Commission critically studied the proposal, a 
revised draft was created in 1958. New York adopted the revised version and other states did 
as well. See CHARLES L. KNAPP, ET AL., RULES OF CONTRACT LAW 362 (2017). See also gen-
erally Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code 1949-
1954, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 359, 375 (2001) (discussing the drafting and adoption process). The 
UCC recognizes unconscionability. See Barnes, supra note 36, at 149–50 (“[Unconscionabil-
ity’s] acceptance as a mainstream doctrine, a ready aid in contract limitation, dates back only 
to its inclusion in the UCC.”). 
255  U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). This provision applies on-
ly to goods transactions. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (“Unless the context otherwise requires, this 
Article applies to transactions in goods”). 
256  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
257  See, e.g., State v. Wolowitz, 468 N.Y.S.2d 131, 145 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Kindred 
Healthcare Operating, Inc. v. Boyd, 403 P.3d 1014, 1022 (Wyo. 2017). 
258  See Resource Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1042 (Utah 
1985) (cataloguing all sorts of procedural bargaining irregularities); see also MURRAY, supra 
note 2, § 97, at 541. 
259  See, e.g., Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58 (Ariz. 1995) (“[C]ontract 
terms so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party, an overall imbalance 
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the terms of the agreement are so one-sided that no one in his right mind would 
agree to its terms.”260 Some courts require both forms of unconscionability, alt-
hough some of these courts apply a sliding scale such that a lower level of one 
type of unconscionability can be offset by a greater level of the other type of 
unconscionability.261 
One aspect of the doctrine that is clear is that the analysis of whether the 
contract or provision is unconscionable must consider the situation at the time 
of the contract’s formation.262 Both the Uniform Commercial Code and the Re-
statement explicitly state that the unconscionability must exist at the time the 
contract is made.263 
Unfortunately, the typical personal injury releasor likely will not find the 
unconscionability doctrine to be a friendly port in the storm.264 Such a plaintiff 
must illustrate that the release was procedurally unconscionable.265 The typical 
release and settlement that the release is a part of is not a complex transac-
tion.266 The plaintiff gets money in exchange for ceasing to pursue any claim 
                                                                                                                                
in the obligations and rights imposed by the bargain . . .”); see also McCullough, supra note 
36, at 797. 
260  West v. West, 891 So. 2d 203, 213 (Miss. 2004). 
261  See, e.g., Kindred, 403 P.3d at 1023 (“In other words, both the absence of meaningful 
choice and the presence of contract provisions unreasonably favorable to one party must be 
found in order to sustain a claim that a contract is unconscionable.”) (citing Roussalis v. 
Wyo. Med. Ctr., Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 246 (Wyo. 2000)); James v. Nat’l Fin., LLC, 132 A.3d 
799, 815 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“The analysis is unitary, and ‘it is generally agreed that if more of 
one is present, then less of the other is required.’ ”) (quoting E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, 1 
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 585 (3d ed. 2004)).With regard to the sliding scale 
nature of the analysis, see Wolowitz, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 145 (“However, in general, it can be 
said that procedural and substantive unconscionability operate on a ‘sliding scale’; the more 
questionable the meaningfulness of choice, the less imbalance in a contract’s terms should be 
tolerated and vice versa”) (quoting Jonathan A. Eddy, On the Essential Purposes of Limited 
Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CALIF. L. REV. 28, 41, 42 n.56 
(1977)); see also Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Slid-
ing Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 12 (2012). Other courts 
seem to allow a finding of unconscionability with only one form of unconscionability. See, 
e.g., Edwards v. Vemma Nutrition, No. CV-17-02133-PHX-DGC, 2018 WL 637382, at *5 
(D. Ariz. Jan. 31, 2018) (requiring only substantive unconscionability). 
262  See James, 132 A.3d at 814 (“Whether a contract is unconscionable is determined at the 
time it was made”); see also Doctor’s Assocs. v. Jabush, 89 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(explaining the same); Clift v. RDP Co., 200 F. Supp. 3d 660, 677 (W.D. Ky. 2016) (ex-
plaining the same). 
263  See U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (“unconscionable at 
the time it was made”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(“unconscionable at the time the contract is made”). 
264  See, e.g., Maglin v. Tschannerl, 800 A.2d 486, 491 (Vt. 2002) (“Because she had an op-
portunity for meaningful choice when the release was presented to her, any differential in 
bargaining power was not critical to the contract’s formation and not enough to void the re-
lease as unconscionable.”). 
265  See supra note 261 and accompanying text. 
266  See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
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against the other party.267 The actual release document is often one or two pag-
es and the language used is relatively clear that the injured party is releasing his 
or her claim for all injuries related to the event, whether or not the injuries are 
known at the time of the release.268 The release is often the product of some ne-
gotiation over time with the actual amount to be paid changing in the midst of 
the back-and-forth.269 While it is certainly true that in most cases the injured 
party does not create the language of the release and simply accepts that lan-
guage, it is also true that the injured party could refuse to enter into the agree-
ment if the terms are unacceptable or could demand more in exchange for the 
executed release. Often, the releasor has the benefit of an attorney’s assistance 
as well.270 In such circumstances it is difficult to find that the release is the 
product of procedural unconscionability. 
An injured party might have an easier time illustrating that the deal is sub-
stantively unconscionable but only if the determination of unconscionability is 
made after the injuries have all come to light.271 Yet, the unconscionability doc-
trine requires that the determination of unconscionability be a determination 
that the agreement was unconscionable at the time of the formation of the re-
lease, not as it later appears with the benefit of hindsight.272 Thus, the uncon-
scionability doctrine, if properly applied, will rarely be the basis for a refusal to 
enforce a personal injury release. 
                                                        
267  See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
268  See discussion supra Part I and Section IV.C. 
269  See, e.g., Hicks v. Sparks, No. 522, 2013, 2014 WL 1233698, at *1 (Del. Mar. 25, 2014) 
(explaining the automobile collision occurred in March and the release was signed in Octo-
ber. The releasee initially offered Hicks $2000. Hicks countered with $7000. The releasee 
then offered $2500. Hicks countered with $5000. The releasee then offered $3000. Hicks 
reiterated a demand of $5000. The releasee then offered $4000 which Hicks accepted); see 
also Witt v. Watkins, 579 P.2d 1065, 1966–67 (Alaska 1978) (noting release signed seven 
months after automobile collision and after negotiation). 
270  See, e.g., Witt, 579 P.2d at 1067 (noting attorney consulted); Simmons v. Blauw, 635 
N.E.2d 601, 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (noting attorney negotiated on her behalf). 
271  See Kelly v. Widner, 771 P.2d 142, 145 (Mont. 1989). The Kelly court found that the 
lower court should not have granted summary judgment for the released party because the 
injured party had raised a question of material fact as to whether the release was unconscion-
able—that is, “whether under all the circumstances, justice was done.” Id. at 146. The court 
noted the injured party was in dire financial straits, that she lacked education, that she lacked 
legal advice, that her living arrangements were isolating, that “there was substantial uncer-
tainty as to the extent of injury . . . and the future prognosis,” and that the settlement had oc-
curred in a hasty fashion. Id. at 145. In so doing the court strayed from traditional uncon-
scionability jurisprudence by noting that “facts subsequent to a settlement may be considered 
in determining unconscionability.” Id. at 146. 
272  See James v. Nat’l Fin. LLC., 132 A.3d 799, 814 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“Whether a contract is 
unconscionable is determined at the time it was made.”); see also Doctor’s Assocs. v. 
Jabush, 89 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1996); Clift v. RDP Co., 200 F. Supp. 3d 660, 677 (W.D. 
Ky. 2016); U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (“unconscionable at 
the time it was made.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 
1981) (“unconscionable at the time the contract is made.”). 
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VIII. ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE: INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF WHETHER THE 
RELEASOR SIGNED THE RELEASE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY: A PROCESS 
ANALYSIS 
If, after a thoughtful consideration of all policy arguments involved, a court 
is of the opinion that personal injury releasors should, categorically, receive 
more deference than traditional contract law provides, the better approach, as 
compared to the current situation, is for courts to forthrightly create a release 
review doctrine apart from traditional common law contract principles. Such an 
approach makes clear that personal injury releases are subject to special treat-
ment and the justification for such treatment can be clearly stated and under-
stood. In addition, traditional doctrine would no longer suffer the indignity of 
being twisted into something far different from its traditional profile.273 In cre-
ating such a release review doctrine, courts should not create a paternalistic 
substantive fairness review, but rather courts should respect the autonomy of 
the parties by using a review focused on process. 
The federal approach to releases of certain federal rights is an example of 
such a stand-alone release review doctrine. When a court reviews the validity 
and enforceability of a release of certain federal rights, that court must ensure 
that the releasor entered into the agreement knowingly and voluntarily.274 In so 
doing, the courts consider the totality of circumstances.275 Courts have created 
lists of factors to guide the totality of circumstances analysis of the process re-
sulting in the release being signed.276 A good example of this approach is that 
of the Eleventh Circuit, which has identified the following factors as objective 
evidence to consider: 
1. the releasor’s education and business experience; 
2. the amount of time the releasor had to review the agreement before sign-
ing it; 
3. “the clarity of the agreement;” 
4. the releasor’s opportunity to be advised by an attorney; 
5. the other party’s encouragement or discouragement of consultation with 
an attorney; and 
6. “the consideration given in exchange for the waiver when compared 
with the benefits to which the employee was already entitled.”277 
                                                        
273  See discussion supra Section IV.B. 
274  Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974) (regarding a Title VII 
matter; “a court would have to determine at the outset that the employee’s consent to the set-
tlement was voluntary and knowing.”). See Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 
65 F.3d 562, 570 (7th Cir. 1995) (regarding ADEA matter; “knowingly and voluntary[ily].”). 
275  See, e.g., Myricks v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 480 F.3d 1036, 1040 (11th Cir. 
2007); Melanson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 281 F.3d 272, 274 (1st Cir. 2002). 
276  See, e.g., Cuchara v. Gai-Tronics Corp., 129 Fed. App’x 728, 731 (3d Cir. 2005); Pierce, 
65 F.3d at 571. 
277  See Myricks, 480 F.3d at 1040; see also Puentes v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 86 F.3d 
196, 198 (11th Cir. 1996). 
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Other jurisdictions use slightly different factors.278 In discussing the non-
exclusive factors used by the Seventh Circuit, the court in Pierce v. Atchison, 
Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company acknowledged that the court was 
providing a system of evaluation of a release that can include evidence extrinsic 
to an unambiguous writing, but limited that evidence to objective evidence 
from disinterested third parties, not a party’s subjective, possibly self-serving 
testimony.279 The Pierce court justified its approach of special scrutiny of re-
leases, even those facially unambiguous, as appropriate to support “the strong 
congressional purpose underlying the ADEA to eradicate discrimination in em-
ployment.”280 Thus, releases of federal rights are not only subject to review on 
any traditional contract basis such as duress or fraud or mistake, but also such 
releases are governed by the idiosyncratic knowing and voluntary requirement 
implemented with the totality of circumstances analysis.281 That special treat-
ment is clearly and tightly tied to a significant public policy and is done in 
recognition of other policies at play such as the policy in favor of settlement, 
even settlement of disputes regarding federally-prohibited discrimination.282 
                                                        
278  For example, in Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., the court established the 
approach for the Seventh Circuit. Pierce, 65 F.3d at 571. The court, reviewing a release of an 
employee’s age and racial discrimination claims under the ADEA, provided the following 
list of non-exclusive factors to consider when determining whether the release was entered 
into knowingly and voluntarily: 
1. the employee’s education and business experience; 
2. the employee’s input in negotiating the terms of the settlement; 
3. the clarity of the agreement; 
4. the amount of time the employee had for deliberation before signing the release; 
5. whether the employee actually read the release and considered its terms before signing it; 
6. whether the employee was represented by counsel or consulted with an attorney; 
7. whether the consideration given in exchange for the waiver exceeded the benefits to which the 
employee was already entitled by contract or law; and 
8. whether the employee’s release was induced by improper conduct on the defendant’s part. 
Id. (citation omitted). Contrary to the Seventh Circuit approach, other courts do not include 
whether the releasor read the release as a factor. These courts apparently hold the more tradi-
tional view that a party signing a document has the obligation to read it. For example, in 
Russell v. Harman Int’l Indus., the court reviewed a release of ERISA claims. Russell v. 
Harman Int’l Indus., 945 F. Supp. 2d 68, 74 (D.D.C. 2013). The Russell court found the re-
lease to be knowing and voluntary and noted that the releasor who signs a document without 
reading it is held to that document. Id. at 75. See Gaub v. Prof’l Hosp. Supply, Inc., 845 F. 
Supp. 2d 1118, 1130 (D. Idaho 2012) (reasoning the court would not accept a failure to read 
as a factor). 
279  Pierce, 65 F.3d at 568. 
280  Id. at 571 (ADEA is the acronym for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). See 
Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 522–23 (3d Cir. 1988) (“In light of the strong 
policy concerns to eradicate discrimination in employment, a review of the totality of the 
circumstances, considerate of the particular individual who has executed the release, is also 
necessary.”). 
281  See, e.g., Washington v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., No. 17 CV 2343, 2018 WL 558501, at *7 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-2626 (7th Cir. July 26, 2018). 
282  See, e.g., Stroman v. W. Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 458, 460–61 (9th Cir.1989) (“A 
general release of Title VII claims does not ordinarily violate public policy. To the contrary, 
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One factor that has received particular emphasis in the federal analysis is 
the assistance of an attorney. Courts have stated that if the releasor had the ben-
efit of the advice of counsel regarding the release and if the release is unambig-
uous by its own terms, a presumption arises the release is valid and enforcea-
ble.283 While the result of such a presumption and thus the result of the totality 
of the circumstances analysis may then be a conclusion that the releasor know-
ingly and voluntarily entered into the agreement such that the party has released 
important federal rights, courts have recognized that they should not attempt to 
subvert traditional principles and interpret subjective intent. Rather, the releasor 
must be left to the deal the releasor formed—supplemented by a possible mal-
practice action against the lawyer.284 Even in a situation in which the releasor 
chooses not to consult with counsel, that choice can be powerful, especially if 
the other party suggested consulting counsel would be helpful.285 
Courts who, after carefully evaluating the competing policies, conclude 
that personal injury releasors should receive more favorable treatment than par-
ties to other agreements might turn to a similar knowing and voluntary analysis. 
Such an approach would allow for a careful review of the process surrounding 
the signing of a release. A court using such an approach could consider such 
process factors as the education and experience of the releasor, whether the re-
leasor had ample opportunity to review the release, whether the releasor en-
joyed the assistance of counsel, whether the releasor was discouraged or en-
couraged to consult with counsel, and whether the release was clear or 
confusingly complex. This sort of analytical framework would allow the court 
to come to a principled decision as to whether the release should be enforced 
and should create an environment in which a court might be less likely to be 
swayed by a releasor’s subjective, hindsight statements that he or she did not 
intend to enter into the deal spelled out by the release itself. A framework that 
explicitly considers such factors as the clarity of the writing and whether the 
releasor was represented forces a focus on what an extraordinary move it is to 
set such a release aside. 
                                                                                                                                
public policy favors voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims brought un-
der Title VII.”) (quoting Rogers v. Gen. Elec. Co., 781 F.2d 452, 454 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
283  See, e.g., Myricks v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 480 F.3d, 1036, 1041 (11th Cir. 
2007) (“[A]n employee’s decision to consult an attorney before signing a clear release cre-
ates a presumption that the release is enforceable.”); Riley v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 881 
F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[A] plaintiff who executes a release within the context of a 
settlement pursuant to the advice of independent counsel is presumed to have executed the 
document knowingly and voluntarily absent claims of fraud or duress.”). 
284  See Riley, 881 F.2d at 374 (“[T]hat plaintiff’s counsel may have inaccurately conveyed 
the effect of the release . . . may be remedied through a malpractice action, but not through 
judicial interpretation of plaintiff’s subjective intent.”). 
285  See, e.g., Cuchara v. Gai-Tronics Corp., 129 Fed. App’x 728, 731 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding 
it “particularly significant” that Cuchara was repeatedly advised in writing to obtain the ser-
vices of counsel). 
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CONCLUSION 
Many courts long have treated personal injury releases differently from 
other contracts when releasors have sought to avoid the effect of the releases. 
These courts have striven to provide more favorable treatment to personal inju-
ry releasors by modifying contract mistake doctrine to make it possible for the 
doctrine to apply in situations in which it otherwise would not apply. In addi-
tion, contrary to what is true with typical written agreements, some courts have 
not given the traditional respect to the writing when the writing is a personal 
injury release that the releasor seeks to avoid. Thus, these releasor-friendly ap-
proaches have found legally-cognizable mistakes and have failed to recognize 
any assumption of the risk by the releasor as a result of the releasor’s conscious 
ignorance or by the express words of the release. 
Courts should no longer provide special treatment for personal injury re-
leasors. The releases should be enforced unless a recognized contract avoidance 
doctrine, traditionally applied, dictates otherwise. The policies behind more fa-
vorable treatment of personal injury releasors are particularly suspect in the 
twenty-first century world. In addition, idiosyncratic modifications to tradition-
al contract doctrines done in the name of this special treatment may do broader 
violence to those doctrines and to the policies underlying contract enforcement 
generally and settlement agreements in particular. 
While the typical personal injury releasor cannot successfully claim mis-
take, other contract doctrines may provide assistance if the facts of the situation 
at hand fit the doctrine. The unconscionability doctrine traditionally has not 
been used but should be considered along with the other avoidance doctrines 
that may be claimed, such as fraud and duress. If a release was unconscionable 
when the agreement was formed, the unconscionability doctrine provides an 
avenue of relief from the release. 
And if a court, after careful consideration, believes the personal injury re-
lease situation deserves more scrutiny, perhaps a process analysis focusing on 
whether the release was knowingly and voluntarily made, patterned after the 
analysis used with releases of certain federal rights, would be a superior alter-
native to an analysis that lacks a workable framework of analysis and thus 
opens the door to ad hoc hindsight judgments by courts as to the fairness of the 
deal struck by the parties. Such a process analysis would provide added protec-
tion to the release setting while at the same time preventing the damage to con-
tract doctrine generally that may occur when that doctrine is bent and applied 
idiosyncratically to provide special treatment to personal injury releases. 
